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I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern capital punishment doctrine has few friends. 1 A recent 
Harvard Law Review article summed up the prevailing wisdom by 
concluding that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a body of doctrine that is 
much worse-either in its costs of implementation or in its negligible 
returns-than the one we have now."2 Until recently, however, modern 
1. This Article uses the phrase modem capital punishment doctrine to refer to the 
legal doctrine developed by the United States Supreme Court, beginning in 1976, to 
govern death penalty cases. That doctrine is summarized infra at Part II.A. 
2. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on 
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
355, 426 (1995). Even articles that find some merit or consistency in the Court's 
doctrine end up arguing that additional safeguards are necessary. See, e.g., F. Patrick 
Hubbard, "Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic 
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doctrine was tolerated because many supposed that its elaborate 
procedures ensured that innocents would not be executed.3 The rising 
tide of evidence to the contrary has left the fate of modem capital 
punishment doctrine in grave doubt.4 
One response, of course, would be to do away with capita] punishment 
entirely.5 But that seems unlikely. The evidence of innocents on death 
Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1161-62 (1985) 
(concluding that "the constitutional model is a justifiable effort to provide more 
consistent, less arbitrary results than prior methods," but calling for a more searching 
review of sentencing patterns). 
3. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are 
Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 469, 470 (1996). "Until recently, most 
judges, lawyers and scholars were willing to believe that the system worked as intended: 
that wrongful capital convictions were rare, and wrongful executions virtually non-
existent." Id. (citing FRANK G. CARRINGTON, NEITIIER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 123 
(1978)); see also Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On 
Sentence, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 21 & n.99 (1995) ("[E]rrors that go to guilt or 
innocence are exceedingly rare in criminal cases, and even more rare in death cases."); 
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 360 ("The public ... presumes that the highly visible 
continuing involvement of the Supreme Court in regulating capital punishment 
insures [sic] ... against arbitrary or unjust executions."). 
4. Recently, more refined techniques for DNA analysis have demonstrated that an 
alarming number of death row inmates likely did not commit the crime for which they 
were awaiting death. Barry C. Scheck, Preventing the Execution of the Innocent: 
Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1165-66 
(2001). These instances, in which the innocence of death row inmates has been 
scientifically proven, have brought into focus the many instances in which death 
sentences have been overturned because of doubts about the defendant's guilt, or 
because the death penalty may be inappropriate by some other measure. See James S. 
Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2048-51 & n.84 
(2000) (citing sources identifying eighty-nine death row inmates who have been freed 
since 1973 because of doubts about their guilt). The evidence of older cases in which 
innocents may have been executed is also being viewed in a new light. See generally 
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital 
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). 
5. The current crisis poses a more significant challenge to capital punishment 
than earlier abolitionist arguments. Past arguments rested on subjective notions of an 
evolving standard of decency, disagreement about the appropriate goals of punishment, 
and supposed-but never conclusively demonstrated-discrimination. See, e.g., Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257-58 (Brennan, 
J., concurring); id. at 314-15 (Marshall, J., concurring). See generally CHARLES L. 
BLACK JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974) 
(making the classic argument that the death penalty should be declared unconstitutional 
because of its arbitrariness and the possibility of mistake). The current challenge rests on 
a firmer ground, indeed on a principle well-known to the founding fathers-that "one 
would much rather that twenty guilty persons should escape the punishment of death 
than that one innocent person should be condemned and suffer capitally." Coffin v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 432,455 (1895) (quoting De Laudibus Legum Angliae). Similar 
formulations of this maxim date back to the Roman Empire-"[I]t was better to Jet the 
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row has produced only calls for moratoriums, until the problems can be 
fixed.6 Public opinion polls continue to show strong, albeit somewhat 
weakened, support for the death penalty.7 The more likely scenario is 
that capital punishment will continue, perhaps governed by new 
doctrinal standards.8 
crime of a guilty person go unpunished than to condemn the innocent" Id. at 454 
(quoting Trajan). "[l]t is better five guilty persons should escape unpunished than one 
innocent person should die." Id. at 456 (quoting Lord Hale). "[T]he law holds that it is 
better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." Id. at 456 (quoting 
Blackstone); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. More recently, 
the Supreme Court has used the principle to justify finding that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a constitutional requirement of due process. See Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). The 
principle was also used to find that a jury of less than six violates the Sixth Amendment. 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978) (relying in part on the fact that it increases 
"the risk of convicting an innocent person" even though it decreases the "risk of not 
convicting a guilty person"). 
6. Several governors and the American Bar Association have called for such a 
moratorium, but not abolition. ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS 
DEATH?: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF 
EXECUTIONS xii (2000); Crystal Nix Hines, Lack of Lawyers Hinders Appeals in Capital 
Cases: Filing Deadlines Missed-Money ls Scarce and Firms Are Reluctant to 
Represent Condemned Prisoners, N.Y. TIMEs, July 5, 2001, at Al. But see LIFTON & 
MITCHELL, supra, at xii (explaining that the New Hampshire Legislature voted to repeal 
the state's death penalty, but the governor vetoed the bill). 
7. Recent polls show a remarkable consistency of opinion both nationwide and in 
individual states. About 60% of respondents say that they support the death penalty. 
LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 213 (reporting that polls conducted in early 2000 
suggest that 64% to 66% favor the death penalty); Death Penalty Informational Center, 
National Polls: USA Today Poll Finds General Death Penalty Support Down to 59% 
(May 4, 2001), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Polls.html (last visited Oct. 
23, 2001) [hereinafter USA Today] (stating that polls conducted in 2000 and 2001 show 
support for the death penalty in the area of 60% ). About an equal percentage support a 
moratorium on executions in light of the recent findings of innocent people on death 
row. USA Today, supra. The percentage who say they support the death penalty drops 
to around 50% when the question presents as an alternative life in prison without parole. 
Death Penalty Information Center, National Polls: ABC News Poll Finds Drop in 
Support for Death Penalty and Majority in Favor of Moratorium (Apr. 24, 2001), 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Polls.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). In a 
1997 debate on the death penalty, Judge Alex Kozinski summed up the sentiment that is 
likely shared by most who support capital punishment: "[I]t is entirely appropriate for 
society to deem some acts so evil, to be so demeaning of human life, that we can say the 
perpetrator has forfeited his own life by committing them." The Modem View of Capital 
Punishment: The Honorable Alex Kozinski vs. Professor Stephen Bright, 34 AM. CRIM. 
L. REv. 1353, 1355 (1997) (publishing an oral debate held on April 7, 1997 at the 
Georgetown University Law Center). 
8. A leading death penalty scholar has presented a proposal effectively replacing 
modern doctrine with a ten-point checklist of relatively black and white requirements 
that state capital punishment systems would be required to meet. Liebman, supra note 4, 
at 2144-50, 2153 (citing as a benefit of the proposed system "the narrowing of federal 
post-direct-appeal review to one court and to ten claims based on relatively mechanical 
and objective requirements"). 
82 
[VOL. 39: 79, 2002] Responsibility in Capital Sentencing 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Abandoning current doctrine would be the wrong response. When 
viewed-as the Court and commentators view it-as a tool to reduce 
arbitrariness and provide an individualized inquiry into the moral desert 
of each defendant, current doctrine appears to be riddled with 
inconsistency and mystery. But the problem lies in the incoherence of 
those twin goals. Putting them aside and focusing on the doctrine in 
fresh light reveals the seed of an approach to capital punishment 
jurisprudence-emphasizing individual responsibility for death-enabling 
decisions at each step in the process from legislative drafting through 
appellate review-that, if fully applied, would yield the firmest possible 
moral foundation for capital punishment. Under this responsibility 
theory, the role of doctrine would be to place ·each participant in the 
sentencing process in an environment in which their sense of responsibility 
is broadened and with it, our trust in their decision. While this environment 
would include the trial courtroom, it must also include the legislative 
chamber, the prosecutor's office, and the appellate courthouse. 
Responsibility holds such an important post in the morality of capital 
sentencing precisely because capital sentencing is a subjective process, 
perhaps dependent on reflective intuition or on an innate ability to 
express the punishment a defendant deserves. If the decision to execute 
were the product of an objective rational calculus, participants in the 
system could simply do the math. They would need to take 
responsibility for applying the formula fairly and correctly. But they 
would not need to assume the deeper responsibility entailed in deciding 
for themselves whether the decision is right. Because the process is 
subjective, however, appropriate capital sentencing decisions can only 
be generated by individuals who take full responsibility for the decisions 
they make. Responsibility of this sort necessarily requires some level of 
discretion. It also requires guidance to discourage actors in the process 
from succumbing to the allure of temptingly easy-to-apply rules of 
thumb that would enable them to escape the need to grapple with the 
enormity of a capital sentencing decision. 
By this measure, modem doctrine is a marked improvement over the 
capital sentencing that existed before that doctrine was adopted. 
Legislatures must now identify specific factors that justify the death 
penalty; sentencers must not disregard any factor relating to the 
character or record of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime 
that call for a lesser sentence, and appellate courts typically provide 
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meaningful review.9 Each of these doctrinal requirements calls upon 
actors at different stages of the process to exercise responsibility that 
was easier to duck under the old capital punishment systems. 
Although modem doctrine is worth preserving, 10 it could be improved 
significantly by focusing explicitly on heightening individual 
responsibility. Two concrete ways to improve it would be to (1) explain 
the sentencer' s role in the narrative voice, a way of speaking that, at 
least in American society, appears to be associated with the assignment 
of responsibility; and (2) require heightened scrutiny of death sentences 
by state appellate courts, bringing the responsibility of state appellate 
judges in capital cases in line with the responsibility they bear in 
constitutional cases dealing with analogous mixed questions of fact and 
law under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, as well as in 
noncapital punishment cases under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Part II summarizes modem death penalty doctrine and surveys the 
wide-ranging criticism of that doctrine both from members of the Court 
and academic commentators. Part III presents the responsibility theory 
as an alternative to the Court's misguided pursuit of consistency and 
individualization in capital sentencing. It explains why individual 
responsibility is necessary to morally acceptable capital punishment and 
shows how modem doctrine tends to advance individual responsibility. 
Concluding subsections respond to likely empirical and theoretical 
criticisms. Part IV proposes reforms of modem doctrine that would 
more fully realize the benefits of the responsibility theory. 
9. See infra Part III.D.3.a-d. 
10. This Article explores the doctrinal criteria to govern capital punishment that is 
most likely to yield appropriate death sentences. There is ample evidence, however, that 
in practice, capital punishment systems are more prone to false positive error than other 
aspects of the criminal justice system for reasons that are unrelated to doctrine and 
potentially intractable. See Gross, supra note 3, at 477-78 (explaining how "the pressure 
to solve homicides" tempts investigators "to cut comers ... if they believe they have the 
killer" and that "[t]he danger that investigators will go too far is magnified to the extent 
the killing is brutal and horrifying, and to the extent that it attracts public attention-
factors which also increase the likelihood that the murder will be treated as a capital 
case"). These errors may undermine any potential moral justification for capital punishment. 
See Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of 
the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1125-31 (1981) (arguing that 
retributivist justification for executing murderers cannot morally justify a state-imposed 
capital punishment system that is known to produce false positive errors). The doctrinal 
proposals offered here are unlikely to significantly improve the practical application of 
capital punishment systems unless the practical problems with the investigation and 
prosecution of capital crimes are addressed. 
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II. MODERN DEATH PENALTY DOCTRINE 
Until the 1970s, capital punishment systems operated essentially 
without governing doctrine.11 State legislatures rarely did more than 
identify crimes for which a sentencer could, in its unguided discretion, 
impose capital punishment. This Part reviews the post-1970 doctrine 
developed by the United States Supreme Court to govern capital 
sentencing and surveys criticism of that doctrine. 
A. Building Modem Doctrine 
In the 1972 case, Furman v. Georgia,12 the Court struck down all 
then-existing death penalty statutes, holding that vesting unguided 
discretion in a sentencing jury "created a substantial risk that it would be 
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."13 Over the next few 
years, thirty-five states adopted new death penalty statutes in an attempt 
to remedy that problem. 14 
In 1976, the Court began the process of building modem capital 
punishment doctrine through decisions in five cases. 15 First, in Gregg v. 
11. In the late 1960s, the Court did impose two limited requirements. See 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) (holding unconstitutional the practice 
of excluding jurors who express scruples against the death penalty from capital cases); 
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (holding that a statute permitting the 
defendant to escape the death penalty by pleading guilty is unconstitutionally coercive). 
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
13. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); id. at 222 (White, J., concurring 
in judgment) (implying that Furman required a system that would "result in death 
sentences being imposed with reasonable consistency"); Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57. 
The holding in Furman only became clear in 1976 when the Court decided Gregg. The 
judgment in Furman was announced in a brief per curiam opinion stating that "the 
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment." Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. Each of the five justices in the 
majority wrote their own opinions, and none of the majority Justices joined the opinion 
of any other. Only two of these justices would have held that the death penalty was per 
se unconstitutional. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360 
(Marshall, J., concurring). The other three did not reach that ultimate question, 
concluding that the existing procedures resulted in the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment because they were arbitrary, unprincipled, discriminatory, or some 
combination thereof. Id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); id. at 310-13 (White, J., concurring). 
14. John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive 
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 Aruz. L. REV. 
143, 226-27, 238-41 (1986). 
15. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
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Georgia, the Court rejected the argument that the death penalty per se 
violated the Constitution.16 Second, the Court held that statutes
imposing a mandatory death sentence on defendants convicted of certain 
crimes did violate the Constitution. 17 And third, the Court upheld three 
statutes in which states had replaced "arbitrary and wanton jury 
discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make 
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." 18 
The opinions in this third category were the most difficult to interpret. 
Each of the three states had adopted a system for narrowing the class of 
death-eligible defendants either by (1) limiting the possibility of a death 
sentence to certain homicide crimes that were defined more narrowly 
than first degree murder 19 or (2) requiring that a jury find an aggravating 
factor-something about the circumstances of the particular crime or the 
character or record of the defendant that justified the most severe 
punishment-in addition to the elements of first degree murder.20 Each 
state also provided a means for. jury consideration of the sentence in a 
separate sentencing proceeding that permitted the introduction of 
evidence in aggravation and mitigation.21 Finally, each state provided an 
opportunity for meaningful appellate review to guard against arbitrary 
sentences.22 
242 (1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. Each of these cases was announced by a joint 
opinion signed by three Justices: Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. 
16. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 ("We hold that the death penalty is not a form of
punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, 
regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in 
reaching the decision . . . .  "); see also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 350-56 (White, J., dissenting) 
(explaining why he believes the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment 
per se). 
17. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331-36; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-305 (holding that
mandatory death sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because they (1) were 
overwhelmingly rejected by the states pre-Furman, (2) merely "papered over the 
problem" of standardless sentencing because juries would continue to nullify murder 
convictions in an ad hoc and standardless fashion, where the jury disagreed with the 
death penalty, and (3) did not provide room for consideration of "compassionate or 
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind"); id. at 305-06 
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring); see Sumner v. Shuman, 
483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (rejecting the argument that an inmate serving a life sentence 
could receive a mandatory death penalty for committing murder). 
18. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269-74 (reviewing a Texas
statute); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-51 (reviewing a Florida statute); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
196-98 (reviewing a Georgia statute).
19. For example, the murder of a police officer. See, e.g., Smith v. Farley, 873 F.
Supp. 1199, 1232 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (citing IND. CODE§ 35-50-2-9(b)(6)(A) (1979)). 
20. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270-71; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-
97. 
21. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271-74; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-
97. 
22. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269-70; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250-53; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
198. 
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Despite saying quite a bit about what these states had done, the 1976 
opinions ultimately did no more than uphold the death penalty statutes in 
question. While they made many things relevant to the constitutional 
inquiry, they did not establish which criteria were essential.23 Over the 
next twenty years, however, the Court derived two relatively clear 
principles from the 1976 cases that were designed to pursue consistency 
across capital sentences and individualized consideration of the unique 
aspects of each crime and defendant. 24 First, states are required to 
narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to some subset of all 
murderers who are more deserving of the death penalty than others.25 
23. The Court ultimately held that two other practices emphasized in the 1976 
opinions-jury sentencing and proportionality review-were not constitutionally 
required. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459--60 (discussing jury sentencing); see 
Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995) (holding that a trial judge may impose a 
capital sentence); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984) (discussing proportionality 
review). 
Commentators argued in the immediate aftermath of the quintet of cases that the 
capital punishment systems as actually applied in Georgia, Florida, and Texas could all 
be found unconstitutional under the principles discussed in the joint opinions in these 
cases and the cases immediately following them. See generally Randy Hertz & Robert 
Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital 
Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REV. 317, 
318 (1981) ("[O]f the three state death penalty statutes upheld in the 1976 Cases, none 
would pass constitutional muster when considered in light of Lockett."). 
24. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46 (1988); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 305--06 (1987). Although the Court has limited its Eighth Amendment 
doctrine to these two requirements, it has struck down a number of death sentences on 
other grounds under the Due Process Clause. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 
154, 156 (1994) (requiring that the jury be instructed that an alternative to the death 
sentence is life without possibility of parol where the state introduces evidence of future 
dangerousness as an aggravating factor); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126--27 
(1991) (requiring notice that the sentencer is considering the death penalty prior to the 
sentencing hearing); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (applying 
principles of double jeopardy to capital sentencing); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 
(1980) (requiring lesser-included-offense instruction where supported by the evidence in 
a capital case); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that "the hearsay rule 
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice" by excluding evidence 
in mitigation of a death sentence at a capital sentencing trial (quoting Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973))); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 15-17 (1978) 
(prohibiting imposition of death penalty on the basis of evidence supporting a charge on 
which no jury finding of guilt was rendered); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 
(1977) (holding that a state may not base a death sentence on information not disclosed 
to the defendant). 
25. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 425-26, 432-33 (1980) (plurality) (holding 
that, where defendant was convicted of killing his wife and mother-in-law with a shotgun 
after a period of marital strife, "[t]he petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have reflected 
a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder" 
87 
Second, states must hold separate proceedings at which sentencers 
would be required to consider, and enabled to give effect to, any 
evidence relating to the character and record of the defendant or the 
circumstances of the crime that the defendant proffered as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.26 
and that "[t]here is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty 
was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not"); see also Arave v. Creech, 507 
U.S. 463, 470-471 (1993). 
[I]t is not enough for an aggravating circumstance, as construed by the state 
courts, to be determinate. Our precedents make clear that a State's capital 
sentencing scheme also must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible 
for the death penalty.' . . . When the purpose of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance is to enable the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve 
capital punishment from those who do not, the circumstance must provide a 
principled basis for doing so. . . . If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an 
aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death 
penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. 
Id. at 474 (citations omitted); see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,327 (1989) (stating in 
dicta that the capital punishment doctrine is intended to prohibit granting capital 
sentencers "unbridled discretion"); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988) 
(holding that "channeling and limiting . . . the sentencer' s discretion in imposing the 
death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement"); California v. Brown, 479 
U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (stating in dicta that "death penalty statutes [must] be structured so 
as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable 
fashion"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984) (stating in dicta that states 
"must administer [the death] penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish between 
those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is 
not"); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,999 (1983) (stating in dicta that the doctrine is 
intended to ensure that "the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily or capriciously"); 
see also Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972-75 (1994) (distinguishing eligibility 
factors that render a defendant eligible for the death penalty from selection factors that 
guide the jury in deciding whether to impose a death sentence on an eligible defendant, 
and holding that the latter need only have "some 'common-sense core of meaning ... 
that criminal juries should be capable of understanding"' (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 
U.S. 262, 279 (1976))); Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, I (1990) (per curiam) 
(discussing proper limiting instructions for jurors). 
26. Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1920-21 (2001) (holding that a state may 
not prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the 
defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigate 
against imposing the death penalty); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397-99 (1987); 
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 
113-14 (1982); cf Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,376,384 (1988) (holding that a state 
may not require unanimous agreement on a mitigating circumstance before individual 
members of the jury may consider it); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174 (1988) 
(plurality) (holding that a state may prohibit consideration of residual doubt about 
defendant's guilt as a mitigating circumstance); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 
(1978) (plurality) (holding that the sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less 
than death"); see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439-44 (1990) (applying 
Mills to a North Carolina statute). 
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B. Criticizing Modem Doctrine 
There has been no shortage of criticism of capital punishment 
doctrine, both from the justices and the commentators. The following 
subsections summarize that criticism. 
1. Criticism from Within the Court 
The first criticism of modern death penalty doctrine came from 
justices who actually comprised a majority of the Court. Gregg and its 
companion cases were announced through joint opinions in which only 
three justices joined.27 For a number of years, the rationale for 
overturning death sentences in most cases was not supported by a 
majority.28 
Some justices attacked the constitutional underpinnings of the 
doctrine. Criminal sentencing had traditionally been a discretionary task 
subject to very limited review, and these justices saw no constitutional 
basis for requiring more for capital punishment. 29 And even if there 
were a constitutional basis for demanding consistency in capital 
sentencing, these justices reasoned, there could be no justification for 
undercutting that requirement by demanding that sentencers consider all 
mitigating evidence with essentially no guiding standards.30 Other 
27. Roberts, 428 U.S. 325, 327 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 280 (1976); Jurek, 
428 U.S. at 264; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158. 
28. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589; Gardner, 430 U.S. at 351. 
29. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The prohibition of the 
Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the process by 
which it is imposed."); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 363 (White, J., dissenting) ("I see no warrant 
under the Eighth Amendment for refusing to uphold these statutes."); Woodson, 428 U.S. 
at 321 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("None of the cases half-heartedly cited by the 
plurality ... comes within a light-year of establishing the proposition that individualized 
consideration is a constitutional requisite for the imposition of the death penalty."). 
Justices continue to express this view. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488 
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
30. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 622-23 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(''The Court has now completed its about-face since Furman .... I greatly fear that the 
effect of the Court's decision today will be to compel constitutionally a restoration of the 
state of affairs at the time Furman was decided .... "). Justice White also expressed 
concern that requiring discretion not to impose the death penalty no matter what crime is 
committed "invites a return to the pre-Furman days when the death penalty was 
generally reserved for those very few for whom society has least consideration." Id. at 
623; id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the 
holding in Lockett "will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of 
sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it. . . . [I]t will not guide sentencing 
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justices bemoaned the doctrine's failure to address meaningfully the 
goals of consistency and individualization.31 
Despite this early criticism, modem doctrine was eventually accepted 
and, for a very brief period in the late 1980s, two unanimous decisions 
created an appearance of stability.32 Even then, some justices questioned 
the tension within the doctrine,33 and less than two years later, the Court 
splintered anew. Two justices who had joined the earlier unanimous 
decisions announced that they would refuse to follow the doctrine in 
future cases. Justice Scalia concluded that he would no longer apply the 
individualization branch of the doctrine because it could not be applied 
in conjunction with the more firmly grounded consistency requirement.34 
Justice Blackmun agreed that the two branches of doctrine could not be 
consistently applied, but since he saw both as constitutionally compelled, he 
refused to vote to uphold any capital sentence.35 A majority of the 
discretion but will totally unleash it"); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 318-19 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that appellate review cannot eliminate arbitrary decisions not to 
impose a death sentence). 
31. See, e.g., Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[I]t is now 
apparent that the defects that led my Brothers Douglas, Stewart, and White to concur in 
the judgment in Furman are present as well in the statutory schemes under which 
defendants are currently sentenced to death."). 
32. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363--65 (1988) (unanimously 
confirming the requirement that the category of defendants eligible for the death penalty 
must meaningfully be narrowed through clear prerequisites); Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 
397-99 (unanimously confirming the requirement that the sentencer must consider 
mitigating evidence relating to character and record of the defendant and the 
circumstances of the crime). 
33. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 (1988) (plurality); California 
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 363 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
34. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 671 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
Pursuant to Furman, and in order "to achieve a more rational and equitable 
administration of the death penalty," we require that States "channel the 
sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific 
and detailed guidance."' In the next breath, however, we say that "the State 
cannot channel the sentencer's discretion ... to consider any relevant [mitigating] 
information offered by the defendant," and that the sentencer must enjoy 
unconstrained discretion to decide whether any sympathetic factors bearing on 
the defendant or the crime indicate that he does not "deserve to be sentenced to 
death." The latter requirement quite obviously destroys whatever rationality 
and predictability the former requirement was designed to achieve. 
Id. at 664--65 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). "Since I cannot possibly be 
guided by what seem to me incompatible principles," he wrote, "I must reject the one 
that is plainly in error." Id. at 673. Justice Scalia announced that he would henceforth 
follow only that branch of modern capital punishment doctrine that called for states "to 
establish in advance, and convey to the sentencer, a governing standard." Id. at 671; see 
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Court's 
ongoing attempt to resolve that contradiction by drawing an arbitrary line in the sand 
between the 'eligibility and selection phases' of the sentencing decision is, in my view, 
incoherent and ultimately doomed to failure."). 
35. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1155 (1994). Like Justice Scalia, Justice 
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Court, however, has continued to apply modern doctrine despite 
recognizing the tension between its two goals. 
2. Academic Criticism of Death Penalty Doctrine 
The voluminous academic attacks on capital punishment doctrine 
come from many angles. Some critics contend that the doctrine 
interferes too much with state capital sentencing systems,36 and others 
Blackmun concluded that the consistency and rationality demanded by Furman are 
inversely related to the fairness required by Woodson and Lockett. Id. "A step toward 
consistency is a step away from fairness." Id. at 1149 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But 
unlike Justice Scalia, he refused to abandon either goal because "there is a heightened 
need for both in the administration of death." Id. at 1155. He concluded: 
[T]he proper course when faced with irreconcilable constitutional commands is 
not to ignore one or the other, nor to pretend that the dilemma does not exist, 
but to admit the futility of the effort to harmonize them. This means accepting 
the fact that the death penalty cannot be administered in accord with our 
Constitution. 
Id. at 1157; see McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1256 (1994) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("Our system of capital punishment simply does not accurately and 
consistently determine which defendants most 'deserve' to die."). 
36. The framers, this argument runs, would not have needed to impose special 
procedures for capital crimes through the Fifth Amendment if the Eighth Amendment 
were intended to regulate capital punishment. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, DEATH 
PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 46-47 (1982). "[S]pecial 
safeguards in application of the death penalty were provided by the Fifth Amendment 
precisely because the Framers postulated that the death penalty was unaffected by the 
Eighth Amendment." Id. at 47; see also Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once 
More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 957-58 (1984). But see Hugo Adam Bedau, Thinking 
of the Death Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 873, 
895 (1984) (arguing that language accepting the death penalty in the Constitution "fails 
to prove ... that it was part of the original intention that the death penalty as such could 
never be incompatible with the eighth amendment [sic]."). 
Other commentators have made the more limited argument that, while the Eighth 
Amendment does require the Court to limit capital sentencing to crimes, defendants, and 
situations for which it is a proportional punishment, the amendment does not support the 
Court's specific doctrine. For example, Scott Howe argues that the amendment provides 
no authority to impose procedural requirements on the states to ensure consistency in 
capital sentencing. Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation 
of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 811 (1998). 
A practical argument against modern doctrine contends that its complexity permits-if 
not requires-extended appeals and collateral attacks. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 
3, at 17. The cost of this litigation in terms of judicial, prosecutorial, and defense 
counsel resources is immense. Id. at 12-16. Both the victim's surviving relatives and 
the inmates on death row pay a huge emotional price as well, as a result of the delays in 
the system. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (describing awaiting 
execution on death row as "one of the most horrible feelings to which [a person] can be 
subjected" (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890))); see also Elledge v. 
Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reasserting the views 
91 
believe the Court has stopped far short of adequately regulating state 
processes.37 One provocative piece argues both, contending that the 
Court has gone too far in regulating relatively insignificant aspects of 
capital sentencing, but has not done enough in areas that really matter.38 
Other commentators have argued that modern doctrine is ineffectual at 
removing arbitrariness from capital sentencing and has created an 
illusion of legality that has improperly legitimized the process.39 Critics 
expressed by Justice Stevens in Lackey); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894, 899 
(Cal. I 972) (striking down the pre-Furman capital punishment statute in California, in 
part because of the "dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to 
execution" which were described as "psychological torture"); Dist. Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 4 I 1 N.E.2d 1274, 1287 (Mass. 1980) (Braucher, J., concurring) 
(relying in part on the delay between sentencing and execution in concluding that the 
state death penalty should be held unconstitutional); Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 3, 
at 17-18 (discussing the impact of time between sentencing and execution on the 
victim's family). 
37. A number of critiques propose a requirement that states narrow the class of 
death eligible defendants more carefully, for example, by limiting broad, vaguely worded 
aggravating circumstances. See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 
101 YALE L.J. 187 (1991) (criticizing the Court for deferring to state legislatures in the 
adoption of aggravating circumstances); DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 102 (1990) (concluding that 
ninety percent of pre-Furman death penalty cases in Georgia would have implicated at 
least one of the aggravating factors rendering a defendant death-eligible under the post-
Furman Georgia statute); Stephen Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional 
Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1037, 
1095-1107 (1985) (criticizing aggravating circumstances that focus on predictions of 
future behavior, rather than historic facts). 
There are other criticisms as well. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra, at 419; Louis D. 
Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1643, 1647-48 & n.20-22 (1993) (citing 
examples); Garvey, supra, at 196-97, 199-204 (discussing prohibiting conclusive 
presumptions requiring a death sentence when aggravating factors outweigh mitigating 
factors and criticizing the Court for narrowing the scope of federal habeas review); 
Gillers, supra, at 1047-95 (arguing that cases upholding judicial sentencing were 
wrongly decided); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 415-16 (requiring states to limit 
death eligibility criteria to ensure that at least one in ten who fit the criteria is sentenced 
to die); id. at 421-25 (calling for higher standards for defense counsel). See generally 
Robert S. Catz, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: Need for a Preclusion 
Doctrine Exception, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1177 (1985) (criticizing the Court's efforts 
to narrow federal habeas corpus review). 
Id. 
38. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 359. 
[W]e conclude that ... the death penalty is, perversely, both over- and under-
regulated. The body of doctrine produced by the Court is enormously complex 
and its applicability to specific cases difficult to discern; yet, it remains 
unresponsive to the central animating concerns that inspired the Court to 
embark on its regulatory regime in the first place .... 
. . . [A]lmost all of the complexity that the Court has injected into death 
penalty law concerns relatively few aspects of state death penalty practices; 
important aspects of those practices remain essentially unregulated. 
39. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 359,402 (commenting that modern doctrine 
"invites if not guarantees the same kinds of inequality as the pre-Furman regime" and 
that "the overall effect of twenty-odd years of doctrinal head-banging has been to 
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have also focused on the internal contradictions within the doctrine that 
have troubled the justices themselves.40 Virtually all agree-in the 
words of Professors Carol and Jordan Streiker-that modem death 
penalty doctrine has been "a colossal failure."41 
Putting aside critical arguments that essentially call for either (1) the 
abolition of all capital punishment, or (2) the elimination of national 
regulation of it, a unifying theme in the criticism is that legal doctrine 
substantially reproduce the pre-Furman world of capital sentencing"); Robert Weisberg, 
Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. REv. 305, 306 ("[T]he Court has reduced the law of 
the penalty trial to almost a bare aesthetic exhortation that the states just do something-
anything-to give the penalty trial a legal appearance."). 
[T]he Court has returned to its pre-Furman view of the penalty decision. It has 
come very close to restoring as the minimal constitutional model . . . the 
bifurcated proceeding in which the jury gets all the information in which it can 
have any legitimate interest, but the law offers it no illusory guidance on the 
decision to kill. 
Id. at 395; see also Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 3, at 27 ("[W]e're not in a very 
different position than we were in twenty-three years ago when the Supreme Court 
wiped the slate clean of all death statutes .... "). 
40. Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions" on Life or Death-If They're Arbitrary, 
Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. REs. L. 
REv. 1067, 1080 (1991); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the 
Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELLL. REV. 655,668 (1989) ("The Court has 
confronted the discretion dilemma: while giving sentencers discretion allows them to 
render decisions on improper bases, regulation of sentencing leads to its own form of 
moral errors resulting from rule rigidity. The choice, therefore, is between two evils."); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for 
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1150, 1180-81 (1979) ("The achievable or imaginable 
level of individualization varies inversely with the achievable or imaginable level of 
consistency."); Steven Semeraro, The Process of Death: Reflections on Capital 
Punishment Issues in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 66 DEN. U. L. REV. 563, 566-
67, 598 (1989) (commenting that "[s]ociety wants predictability and rationality, but 
craves fairness," that "[i]t has yet to find a way to have both," and concluding that 
modem doctrine's procedural focus masks the contradiction); Scott E. Sundby, The 
Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital 
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147, 1161 (1991). 
Robert Schopp argues that the twin goals of consistency and individualization are not 
inconsistent. Robert F. Schopp, Reconciling "Irreconcilable" Capital Punishment 
Doctrine as Comparative and Noncomparative Justice, 53 FLA. L. REv. 475, 493-94 
(2001) (commenting that "the two requirements of guided discretion to promote 
comparative justice and of individualized assessment of all evidence relevant to 
retributive justice are not only consistent with each other, consistent application of the 
latter constitutes the former"). But he reaches that conclusion only by redefining the 
individualization requirement to encompass consideration of only those factors reflected 
in positive law. Id. at 520-24. This truncation of the individualization requirement 
simply renders it another set of rules that may fail to take account of factors that the 
legislature might have considered mitigating had it thought of them in advance. 
41. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 359. 
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should dictate rules that would at root help-in the sense of making it 
easier for-participants in the capital sentencing process to produce 
more accurate death sentencing decisions. This Article introduces a very 
different role for capital sentencing doctrine: while it should enable 
participants in the process, from legislators to appellate courts and 
governors, to produce-for lack of a better phrase-more appropriate 
sentencing decisions,42 it cannot dictate results and make their jobs 
easier. On the contrary, the doctrine should enable more appropriate 
sentences by making each participant's job very, very hard. It can do 
this by fostering an environment in which responsible decision-making 
is demanded. The process will not be pleasant for individuals 
participating in it. But their decisions will be more worthy of trust. The 
next Part explores the contours of a responsibility theory of capital 
punishment and shows how modern doctrine has-perhaps 
inadvertently-fostered responsibility at various stages of the process. 
III. REINTERPRETING MODERN DOCTRINE: A RESPONSIBILITY THEORY 
This Part begins by identifying the inadequacy of the Court's goals of 
consistency and individualization. It then postulates an alternative 
goal-to heighten the individual responsibility of legislators, 
prosecutors, jurors, and appellate courts. The subsections explaining this 
alternative goal examine the tendency of American legal theory to 
describe legal systems that function consistently without relying on 
individual responsibility. They then explore an alternative conception of 
a legal system that demands responsible participants and conjectures that 
incorporating responsibility may be necessary-despite American legal 
traditions to the contrary-when the law demands decisions on stark 
moral questions. Next, they explain how modern doctrine has in fact 
heightened the individual responsibility of participants in the process 
compared to pre-Funnan capital sentencing. The final two subsections 
respond to likely empirical and theoretical criticisms. 
A. Identifying the Problem with the Twin Goals: Consistency and 
Individualization 
The Court's attempt to reduce arbitrariness and preserve individualized 
consideration of all relevant factors bearing on the defendant's personal 
moral responsibility has resulted in theoretical gridlock in capital 
42. Because capital sentencing decisions are not the product of a rational calculus, 
use of the term accurate seems inappropriate. The better descriptive of the quality of a 
capital sentencing decision is appropriate. 
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punishment doctrine.43 The way out must recognize that the problem is 
not the Court's doctrine, but its goals. The words consistency and 
individualization are used appropriately to express relationships between 
legal systems. One system can be more (or less) arbitrary or more (or 
less) open to individuating factors.44 But these terms cannot describe an 
absolute quality of a particular system. Because we can say that one 
system may be more arbitrary than another, we fool ourselves into 
thinking that we can also conceive of and describe a system as 
absolutely consistent, and vice versa.45 
43. In Robert Weisberg's words: 
Capital punishment is at once the best and worst subject for legal rules. The 
state's decision to kill is so serious, and the cost of error so high, that we feel 
impelled to discipline the human power of the death sentence with rational 
legal rules. Yet a judge or jury's decision to kill is an intensely moral, 
subjective matter that seems to defy the designers of general formulas for legal 
decision. 
Weisberg, supra note 39, at 308. 
44. While one could argue for a system that was neither too arbitrary nor too 
individuating, the Court's jurisprudence does not suggest that it has been seeking a 
balancing point on a continuum. Rather, the Court has required both that "the 
sentence ... should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, 
character, and crime," Penry v. Lynaugh 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989), and that "[t]he 
State ... 'channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide 
specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for 
imposing a sentence of death."' Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993) (quoting 
Godfrey v. Georgia 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)). While there are also indications in the 
opinions that the Court is not requiring perfect systems, it appears to be seeking systems 
that are both consistent and individuating in some absolute sense. See Joseph L. 
Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 
120-21 (distinguishing between doctrine that merely requires some measure of 
consistency with one seeking a "precise 'fit"' between defendant and sentence). 
Commentators, too, appear to have assumed that some sort of absolutely consistent and 
individuating system is (or should be) the goal of modem doctrine. See, e.g., Radin, 
supra note 40, at 1150, 1180-81. 
45. This is an attempt to think about the language used to describe capital 
punishment systems in a way that is often associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. See 
LUD\VIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INvEsTIGATIONS 'I[ 109 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1972). He describes his effort to understand philosophical problems by 
"looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us 
recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems 
are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always 
known." Id. Of course, one may be more directly influenced by A.A. Milne: 
"The question is, What are we to do about Kanga?" 
''The best way," said Rabbit, "would be this. The best way would be to steal 
Baby Roo and hide him, and then when Kanga says, 'Where's Baby Roo?' we 
say, 'Aha!"' 
"Ahaf' said Pooh, practising. "Aha! Aha! ... Of course," he went on, "we 
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Consistent legal systems and wholly individuating legal systems may 
be the dragons and the unicorns of legal theory. We can spend an 
enormous amount of time contemplating what they might be like. But 
they almost certainly can never exist. Legal systems govern interactions 
between members of a society. As such, the system must employ 
language. But language is generalization. We call things by the same 
name, though we can imagine reasons to treat them differently. As a 
result of this generalization, no legal system can truly take account of all 
individuating factors because some factors will always be lost in the 
generality of language. For much the same reason, no system can ever 
be entirely consistent. No matter how detailed the set of linguistic rules 
developed to govern interaction in the system, the rules will invariably 
include generalities that will fail to take account of factors that would 
need to be considered to produce a truly consistent system.46 
The author emphasizes the reference to truly individuating or 
consistent legal systems, because it may be senseless to speak of even 
the concept of a system that is absolutely one or the other. Given that 
individuals organize their thoughts through the generalizations of 
language, it is possible that we cannot even really imagine what a truly 
consistent or individuating system would be like, much less actually 
create one.47 It is not just that one system cannot produce results that are 
both unique and consistent at the same time,<18 it may be that no 
could say 'Aha!' even if we hadn't stolen Baby Roo." 
"We say 'Aha!' [Rabbit explained] so that Kanga knows that we know where 
Baby Roo is. 'Aha!' means 'We'll tell you where Baby Roo is, if you promise 
to go away from the Forest and never come back."' .. . 
Pooh went into a comer and tried saying 'Aha!' ... Sometimes it seemed to 
him that it did mean what Rabbit said, and sometimes it seemed to him that it 
didn't. "I suppose it's just practice," he thought. "I wonder if Kanga will have 
to practise too so as to understand it." 
A.A. MILNE, WINNIE-THE-POOH 93 (1926). 
46. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 50 (1991) ("This 
under- and over-inclusiveness [of rule-based systems] ... is largely ineliminable, the 
product of entrenchment and not simply of how specific or how general a rule happens to 
be."); see id. at 50 n.14 ("But rules achieve clarity, certainty, and determinateness, at the 
price of including either more or fewer cases in the legal categories defined by the rules 
than the rationale underlying the rule calls for." (quoting GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM 
AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 447 (1986))). 
47. Try performing a thought experiment in which you conceive of and describe 
what an absolutely consistent or absolutely individuating system would be like. At a 
very high level of generality, you will likely be able to imagine such a system. But as 
you start thinking about what a particular system might look like, the mental picture will 
blur. 
48. Weisberg, supra note 39, at 327. 
The Court had put itself between a rock and a hard place. Furman demanded 
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system-in theory, much less in fact-can produce results that are either 
one. While the question whether a consistent or individuating system 
could exist in theory is perhaps more appropriate for philosophers than 
lawyers, the impossibility of achieving a system of either absolute type 
in practice is enough to justify rejecting the Court's goal of achieving 
both. 
B. The Possibility of an Individual-Responsibility-Based 
Theory of Capital Sentencing 
If the metagoal of capital punishment doctrine is to ensure that death 
sentences reflect an appropriately reasoned moral judgment that a 
particular defendant deserves to die,49 individualization and consistency 
should be replaced with the goal of maximizing the individual 
responsibility of each decision-maker in the capital sentencing process. 
Responsibility is important to ensuring a morally grounded decision 
because decision-making differs in significant ways depending on the 
level of responsibility the decision-maker perceives he has for the 
outcome.50 Psychological research shows that individuals with 
perceived responsibility will make more reflective, carefully considered 
decisions.51 They will take more time and avoid the biases that may, 
Id. 
horizontal equity among capital murderers, thereby calling for formal rules of 
law governing their sentences. Similar people and crimes must be treated 
similarly. But a rule that treats similar people similarly is a categorical 
generalization which cannot account for uniqueness. A person cannot be both 
"unique" and "equal." 
49. The concept of deserts with capital punishment doctrine extends beyond the 
mental state with which the defendant acted to encompass as full a consideration as 
possible of the defendant's entire life experience and place in the community. See 
Penry, 492 U.S. at 319, 327-28; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 112 (1982); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976); Schopp, supra note 40, at 
492 (recognizing that the Court's opinions "identify considerations of character, record, 
circumstances, background, impairment, duress, emotional pressure, and provocation as 
relevant to ... culpability[; t]hus, these opinions apparently contemplate a relatively 
broad notion of culpability as blameworthiness or desert"). 
50. Steven J. Sherman, The Capital Jury Project: The Role of Responsibility and 
How Psychology Can Inform the Law, 70 IND. L.J. 1241, 1242 (1995). For example, 
people respond differently to crime and accident victims depending on their level of 
perceived responsibility. David R. Shaffer et al., Intervention in the Library: The Effect 
of Increased Responsibility on Bystanders' Willingness to Prevent a Theft, 5 J. APPLIED 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 303 (1975). 
51. At least one commentator has argued that enhancing responsibility would 
likely reduce death sentences because responsible decision-makers tend to minimize 
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perhaps unconsciously, control less thoughtful, more snap judgments.52 
The role of legal doctrine should be to ensure that each actor in the 
process assumes an appropriate degree of individual responsibility for 
his or her role. The challenge for doctrine builders is to overcome the 
tendency for individuals-including legislators, prosecutors,53 jurors,54 
and judges55-to seek out ways to lessen their sense of responsibility.56 
negative outcomes, and the imposition of a death sentence is the most likely perceived 
negative outcome. Sherman, supra note 50, at 1242-43. It is unclear, however, why a 
juror would necessarily view the imposition of a death sentence as more of a negative 
outcome than permitting a brutal murderer to possibly kill again-inside or outside the 
penitentiary system. See Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 
91 ( 1990) ("It does not follow from this reasoning that the responsible juror, moved by a 
sympathetic understanding of the defendant's circumstances, will necessarily opt for life 
over death. The juror must be responsible to and for the entire community, not just the 
defendant before her."); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital 
Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 378 (1996) ("We thus cannot 
reject the hypothesis of no significant relationship between jurors' perceptions of 
responsibility and the sentencing outcome."). 
52. For example, psychologists have found that individuals use more complex 
judgment strategies rather than simple heuristic principles when they perceive a greater 
sense of responsibility for their decision. Philip E. Tetlock & Jae II Kim, Accountability 
and Judgment Processes in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 700 (1987). A sharing of responsibility among a group, either among jurors or 
among participants at different levels in the system, is also problematic because common 
or group responsibility is more likely to yield "polarized" and "extreme decisions." 
Sherman, supra note 50, at 1246 & nn.21-22. 
53. See, e.g., Michael Leonard & Robert Robertson, The Death Penalty: Personal 
Perspectives, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. I, 14-15 (1990) (citing interviews with prosecutors 
who claim that filing death cases is simply "part of their duties"). 
54. Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, The Death Penalty: Public Opinions, Legal 
Decisions, and Juror Perspectives, in VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 246, 264-65 (Mark 
Costanzo & Stuart Oskamp eds., 1994) (describing that many jurors "discount their own 
sense of responsibility for the verdict"-"'[i]t was more comforting to focus on the 
questions'"); Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task 
Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 1345, 1376-77; Anthony Paduano & Clive 
A. Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the 
Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21 I, 213 n.3 (1987) 
(citing studies that suggest that many jurors do not believe that any death sentence 
rendered will actually be carried out). 
55. Seth Kaberon, The Death Penalty: Personal Perspectives, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
34, 36, 38 (1990) (citing statements by judges that death cases are determined by the 
evidence and that the judge does not "have any control over the evidence," and "as a 
judge[,] sworn to uphold the law, [he] must impose death in the proper circumstances"). 
56. Indeed, this phenomenon likely extends well beyond capital sentencing to 
other areas where individuals are required to make decisions that affect others in morally 
significant ways. For example, doctors making civil commitment and termination-of-
medical-treatment decisions may also attempt to "escape the dilemma when the law 
offers them the 'choice to be choiceless' through a mechanical formula of decision 
cloaked in the rhetoric of professional authority." Weisberg, supra note 39, at 393. It is 
important to question whether any of these actors succeed or just use post hoc 
rationalization to help deal with the dilemma. Costanzo & Costanzo. supra note 54, at 
268-69 (explaining that jurors often feel remorse and sorrow and suffer from 
nightmares, insomnia, and posttraumatic stress disorder); William S. Geimer & Jonathan 
98 
[VOL. 39: 79, 2002] Responsibility in Capital Sentencing 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
This subsection first places modern doctrine in the context of 
American legal theory, which lacks a well-developed concept of 
individual responsibility. It then explores how a concept of individual 
responsibility could be incorporated into American legal thinking about 
the death penalty. The following subsection then explores why 
incorporating individual responsibility into capital punishment theory is 
necessary, and why the Court has, perhaps unconsciously, developed 
doctrine that serves the responsibility theory much better than the goals 
the Court has been ostensibly pursuing. 
1. Traditional American Legal Theory 
American legal theory has been dominated by two distinct ways of 
thinking, sometimes called: (1) rights theory, and (2) democratic 
theory.57 Rights theory recognizes that individuals possess rights that 
the government must respect, through court enforcement if necessary. 
Rights may exist as a matter of positive law set forth in the specific 
language of a constitution or statute. Alternatively, rights may be an 
expression of the morality of a society. On this more expansive view, 
rights not specifically enumerated in the language of legal texts can be 
identified by looking to the moral values that led to the declaration of the 
rights that are directly set out. In either case, individuals are entitled to 
have their rights upheld irrespective of the individual or collective 
desires or welfare of others.58 
Democratic theory places faith in the decisions of elected bodies to act 
in the public interest and trusts courts to interpret laws generated by 
these elected bodies. Like rights theory, democratic theory has two 
branches: (1) pluralism, and (2) republicanism.59 Pluralism assumes that 
democratic institutions act in the public interest because elected officials 
can discover, sum, and implement the individual interests and desires of 
their constituents. Republicanism assumes that elected bodies will reach 
Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death 
Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 46 (1987-88). 
51. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1978) 
(articulating rights-based American legal theory); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (exploring the history of democratic 
legal theory in America); Robin West, supra note 51, at 43 (distinguishing rights-based 
and democratic legal theory). 
58. See sources cited supra note 57. 
59. Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. PoL'Y 203, 215-17 (2000) (distinguishing pluralism and republicanism). 
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public-interested decisions through a process of open-minded debate. 
But those decisions may not accord in any mathematical sense to the 
individual preferences of the legislators' constituents.60 
Markedly absent from American legal theory is a concept of 
individual responsibility.61 Individual rights-whether based in positive 
law or morality-extend to everyone whether they act responsibly or 
not. Also, while individuals must respect the rights of others, they need 
not take responsibility for their own actions in the sense that the required 
code of conduct is defined for them by the definition of the existing 
rights. As Robin West has written: "We need not understand, much less 
sympathize, with the subjective experience of our fellow right-holder, 
because we give him his due when we accord him his rights, and his 
rights, by right, insulate him from the psychic invasion such sympathetic 
understanding of his subjectivity would implicate."62 
Pluralism, like rights talk, diminishes responsibility by permitting self-
interest to control individual behavior. Constituents bear no 
responsibility for their preferences; they simply cast votes for legislators 
who they believe will advance those preferences. And elected officials 
too take no real responsibility for their actions. They are incentivized by 
the desire for votes and reelection. Public actors simply advance 
interests that are dictated to them by their constituents. 
Even republicanism requires only a very truncated form of individual 
responsibility among elected officials. They must maintain a level of 
open-mindedness throughout the process of debate, but no general 
assumption of personal responsibility outside the governmental process 
is necessary. 
Criticism of death penalty doctrine is an outgrowth of American legal 
theory. Within a rights-centered framework, the critic sees conflicting 
rights to a capital sentencing system that is both (1) consistently 
governed by a strict rule of law, and (2) flexible, so as to account for all 
Id. 
60. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Y ALEL.J. 1493, 1508 (1988). 
[I]n pure pluralist vision, good politics does not essentially involve the 
direction of reason and argument towards any common, ideal, or self-
transcendent end. For true pluralists, good politics can only be a market-like 
medium through which variously interested and motivated individuals and 
groups seek to maximize their own particular preferences. 
61. Legal theorists contend that responsibility is essential to the proper operation 
of the rule of law. But they appear to apply a narrower definition of responsibility that 
consists merely of the ability to comprehend and follow rules. LON L. FULLER, THE 
MORALITY OF LAW 162 (rev. ed. 1969) ("To embark on the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the 
view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and 
following rules, and answerable for his defaults."). 
62. West, supra note 51, at 71. 
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individual factors. The two rights are contradictory. There is no 
balance. Strict rules remove flexibility, and flexible standards are utterly 
inconsistent with clear rules. Within this realm, either Justice Scalia or 
Justice Blackmun must be right.63 Either defendants facing the death 
penalty do not have an entitlement to both rights-as Justice Scalia has 
concluded-or the death penalty must be prohibited because courts 
cannot enforce both rights-as Justice Blackmun has concluded. 
From a democratic perspective, modern doctrine seems entirely 
unnecessary. Pre-Furman, one could argue that the legislature had failed 
to meaningfully make the law.64 By simply making capital punishment 
available in murder and rape cases, the legislature was effectively 
passing the law-making function to juries. Modern doctrine, however, is 
sufficiently law-like to satisfy either pluralist or republican conceptions 
of the legislative role. 65 
2. Articulating a Responsibility Theory 
Given the dominant strains in American legal theory, one should not 
be surprised that modern capital punishment doctrine has virtually no 
supporters. Under either a rights- or democracy-driven theory, it is 
unsupportable. 
An entirely different perspective on modern capital punishment 
doctrine can be attained by abandoning dominant American legal theory 
and replacing it with a theory that demands and assumes individual 
responsibility. Although this approach is rare in academic legal theory, 
the concept is innately understood by jurists and has been articulated 
eloquently in the writings of Vaclav Havel.66 
A key example of a judicial application of the concept is the pre-
Furman case, McGautha v. Califomia.61 There, the Court rejected a due 
process challenge to capital sentencing schemes that provided for 
unguided jury discretion.68 The Court reasoned that providing 
63. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
64. See Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (White, J., concurring) 
(''Legislative ,'policy' is thus necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized 
but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon 
them."). 
65. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 221-22 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
66. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text. 
67. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
68. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 
Notwithstanding facts, if any, proved in mitigation or aggravation, in 
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meaningful guidance would be impossible. "To identify before the fact 
those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which 
call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in 
language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing 
authority," Justice Harlan wrote for the Court, "appear to be tasks which 
are beyond present human ability."69 But McGautha was more than an 
exhortation of the futility of legal doctrine. On the contrary, it was an 
affirmation of faith that individuals compelled to decide whether another 
person should live or die would take that responsibility seriously. When 
jurors are "confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of 
decreeing death for a fellow human," the Court must have believed that 
jurors possess an innate capacity to empathize with a capital defendant 
and comprehend the values of the community, and that this capacity is a 
better moral compass for death sentences than any preset standards a 
detached legislature might devise.70 That conclusion was not based on 
rights analysis or democratic theory. It looked directly to our innate 
capabilities as human beings to exercise responsibility for monumental 
decisions.71 
determining which punishment shall be inflicted, you are entirely free to act 
according to your own judgment, conscience and absolute discretion .... 
. . . [T]he law itself provides no standard for the guidance of the jury in the 
selection of the penalty, but, rather, commits the whole matter of determining 
which of the two penalties shall be fixed to the judgment, conscience, and 
absolute discretion of the jury. 
Id. at 189-90. 
69. Id. at 204. 
70. Id. at 208; see Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception 
of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1156 (1995) 
(reading Justice Harlan's opinion in this way). 
71. Weisberg, supra note 39, at 312 ("Harlan does not say that a jury's decision to 
kill is inevitably irrational. He says with some confidence that as jurors face so 
obviously awesome a decision they will naturally act with appropriate moral seriousness, 
guided by at least intuitive moral rationality."). In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the other 
Supreme Court case to touch on responsibility, the Court declared that it assumed the 
sentencer would be responsible and cited numerous state cases reflecting the importance 
of preserving the jurors' sense of responsibility for their task. 472 U.S. 320, 333, 334 n.4 
(1985); see, e.g., People v. Myers, 729 P.2d 698, 711-12 (Cal. 1987) (commenting that 
an instruction informing the jury about commutation improperly "diminish[es] the jury's 
appreciation of its personal responsibility for the sentencing decision"); Fleming v. State, 
240 S.E.2d 37, 40 (Ga. 1977) (holding that "this type of remark [lessening juror's sense 
of responsibility] has an unusual potential for corrupting the death sentencing process"); 
Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404,408 (Ky. 1985) (holding that "the prosecutor 
clearly sought to divert from the minds of the jurors their true responsibility in this case 
by implying that the ultimate responsibility would fall to the trial judge, this court, [or] 
other appellate courts" and that "[t]his is clearly an error ofreversible magnitude"); State 
v. Berry, 391 So. 2d 406, 418 (La. 1980) (holding that comments lessening jurors' sense 
of responsibility deny the defendant "a fair trial in the sentencing phase, and the penalty 
should be vacated"); Wiley v. State, 449 So. 2d 756, 762 (Miss. 1984) ("While a jury is 
not literally 'the hangman,' only they may supply the hangman's victims. All notions of 
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A fuller understanding of an individual responsibility-driven legal 
theory can be derived from the political writings of Vaclav Havel.72 
Havel elevates responsible individual decisionmaking above both 
individual rights and democratic institutions as the fountainhead of an 
alternative to what he called "post-totalitarian"--or later, "advanced 
totalitarian"-society in Eastern Europe in the late 1970s and early-to-
mid 1980s.73 He urged his society to strive to: 
plac[e] ... responsibility above our desires, in making human community 
meaningful, in returning content to human speaking, in reconstituting, as the 
focus of all social action, the autonomous, integral, and dignified human "I," 
responsible for ourselves because we are bound to something higher, and 
capable of sacrificing something, in extreme cases even everything, ... for the 
sake of that which gives life meaning.74 
justice require that the jurors as individuals, and as a body, recognize and appreciate the 
gravity of their role."); Hill v. State, 432 So. 2d 427, 439 (Miss. 1983) ("Any argument 
by the state which distorts or minimizes this solemn obligation and responsibility of the 
jury is serious error. . . . [I]n a death penalty case a jury should never be given false 
comfort that any decision they make will, or can be, corrected."). More recent cases 
have criticized certain religious analogies in prosecutorial argument for lessening the 
jury's sense of responsibility. See Sandoval v. Calderon, 231 F.3d 1140, 1151 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that "delegation of the ultimate responsibility for imposing a sentence to 
divine authority undermines the jury's role in the sentencing process"); Buttrum v. 
Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 1989); People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 692-93 
(Cal. 1998); People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1134-36 (Cal. 1993); Carruthers v. State, 
528 S.E.2d 217, 221-22 (Ga. 2000). 
72. Havel's comment in a 1987 interview that "I'm against anything that serves to 
cloud personal responsibility" captures well the essence of his thinking. V.AcLA v 
HAVEL, On the Theme of an Opposition, in OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS 1965-
1990 at 25 (Paul Wilson ed., 1991). Robin West first looked to Havel's writing as a 
basis for incorporating a responsibility-based legal theory into American law in Taking 
Freedom Seriously. West, supra note 51, at 63-71. 
73. Havel's understanding of responsibility is quite broad. He saw individuals as 
responsible not just for their own decisions but for the state of the society in which they 
live "through the daily personal decisions of each responsible human being which went 
to create the total state of affairs." VACLAV HAVEL, "Dear Dr. Husak," in OPEN 
LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS 1965-1990 at 50, 81 (Paul Wilson ed., 1991) (quoting an 
April 1975 open letter to Dr. Gustav Husak, then general secretary of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party). 
74. VACLAV HAVEL, Politics and Conscience, in OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED 
WRITINGS 1965-1990 at 249, 263 (Paul Wilson ed., 1991) [hereinafter HAVEL, Politics] 
(quoting a 1984 speech written to acknowledge an honorary doctorate awarded by the 
University of Toulouse). In The Power of the Powerless, a 1978 essay to stimulate 
discussion on the subject of freedom and power in eastern Europe, he stated "it is not just 
the expression of an introverted, self-contained responsibility that individuals have to 
and for themselves alone, but responsibility to and for the world." V A.CLA v HAVEL, The 
Power and the Powerless, in OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS 1965-1990 at 125, 194 
(Paul Wilson ed., 1991) [hereinafter HAVEL, The Power]. 
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Havel contrasts this vision of individual responsibility with a system 
in which individuals look to government not as a device to enable them 
to "realize themselves as human beings, but so they may surrender their 
human identity in favor of the identity of the system."75 Rather than take 
individual responsibility, he writes, "there is obviously in modem 
humanity a certain tendency toward . . . the toleration"76 of a social 
system in which they share "common responsibility."77 
To be sure, Havel's focus is broader than legal theory. But law is 
certainly encompassed within his vision. For him, strict adherence to an 
external legal code is-if not immoral-certainly not morally 
stimulating.78 Bettering social life, he stresses, "is a job for people and 
not for laws and institutions."79 Rigid adherence to a rule of law, 
whether a constitutional code of individual rights or democratic 
legislation, stifles individual responsibility by eliminating the need for 
it.SO 
Within American legal traditions, individuals need not be responsible 
for their own actions in the sense that, if the code is followed, the actions 
are acceptable. Within legal systems, there is no assumption of, or 
requirement that, individuals display civic virtues, such as compassion 
for others, in making decisions that affect their community. Civic 
virtues are not formally discouraged, but by failing to demand and 
75. HAVEL, The Power, supra note 74, at 143. 
76. Id. at 144-45 ("In everyone there is some willingness to merge with the 
anonymous crowd and to flow comfortably along with it down the river of pseudo-
life."). In Politics and Conscience, Havel wrote that "[m]an rejected his responsibility as 
a 'subjective illusion'-and in place of it installed what is now proving to be the most 
dangerous illusion of all: the fiction of objectivity stripped of all that is concretely 
human." HAVEL, Politics, supra note 74, at 255. 
77. HAVEL, The Power, supra note 74, at 143; see id. at 176 ("This independent 
life is not separated from the rest of life ('dependent life') by some sharply defined line. 
Both types frequently co-exist in the same people."). "This professional ruler is an 
'innocent' tool of an 'innocent' anonymous power .... " HAVEL, Politics, supra note 74, 
at 257. Havel then contrasts the responsibility inherent in an individual's idea to create a 
better world and the irresponsibility of surrendering to an ideology: 
[W]hen an idea ceases to express the transcendent dimension of being human 
and degenerates into a substitute for it, the moment when product, the plan for 
a better world, ceases to be an expression of man's responsible identity and 
begins, on the contrary, to expropriate his responsibility and identity, when the 
abstraction ceases to belong to him and he instead begins to belong to it. 
VACLAV HAVEL, Anatomy of a Reticence, in OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS 1965-
1990 at 291,302 (Paul Wilson ed., 1991). 
78. For example, he explains how a legal code "lets individuals fool themselves 
into thinking they are merely upholding the law and protecting society from criminals," 
when in fact, they are reinforcing an ideology for which they are not taking individual 
responsibility. HAVEL, The Power, supra note 74, at 188. 
79. Id. at 191. 
80. Id. at 191-92. "The key to a humane, dignified, rich and happy life does not 
lie either in the [C]onstitution or in the Criminal Code." Id. at 191. 
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respect them, they fall to the realm of purely private decision. 81 While 
individuals may take individual responsibility, the law as understood by 
traditional American legal theory does not expect or demand it. 
By contrast, Havel's vision of law would demand a great deal from 
individuals. They would be expected to exercise compassion and 
sympathy for others. As Havel describes the goal: "We [should] not be 
ashamed" of individual virtues; they should be "free[d] from their 
'private' exile and accept[ed] ... as the only genuine starting point of 
meaningful human community."82 More specifically with regard to law, 
Havel rejects the notion that responsible citizens can simply adhere to a 
preestablished legal code: "These merely establish what may or may not 
be done and, thus, they can make life easier or more difficult. They limit 
or permit, they punish, tolerate, or defend, but they can never give life 
substance or meaning."83 Havel stressed that law must be viewed 
"against the background of life as it really is."84 Without individual 
responsibility, members of a society "become . . . satisfied if all the 
appropriate regulations have been observed."85 "A reaffirmed human 
responsibility," he offers, "is the most natural barrier to all 
irresponsibility. "86 
C. The Necessity of an Individual-Responsibility-Based Theory of 
Capital Punishment 
A responsibility-based theory of capital punishment is not a variant of 
81. Robert Schopp reinterprets modem doctrine in a way that would prohibit 
sentencers from acting as the responsible agents Havel envisions because Schopp 
believes that that sort of personal responsibility is inconsistent with the rule of Jaw. 
Schopp writes: 
Authorizing the jury to sentence offenders by appeal to the community 
conscience understood either as moral principles endorsed by the jury as a 
sample of the community or as the informal social consensus as understood by 
the jury would violate the fundamental boundary between the public and 
nonpublic domains of a liberal society. It would do so by subjecting the 
offender to sentencing according to standards regarding which he had no 
notice and no opportunity to participate in establishing. 
Schopp, supra note 40, at 516. Schopp is correct in his analysis of American legal 
theory, but wrong to assume that, in practice, American society actually subscribes to 
that theory. 
82. HAVEL, Politics, supra note 74, at 267. 
83. HAVEL, The Power, supra note 74, at 191-92. 
84. Id. at 192. 
85. Id. 
86. HAVEL, Politics, supra note 74, at 268. 
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some exotic eastern European legal theory that would require radical 
restructuring of the way we think about law. 87 On the contrary, 
individual responsibility is a necessary component of any justification of 
a capital punishment system that arises of its own accord from the way 
that we in fact think about the death penalty. 88 This section explores the 
disconnect between American legal theory and our actual beliefs with 
respect to capital punishment. It concludes that American legal theory 
highlights or emphasizes certain aspects of our thinking about law-in 
particular our desire for rational, predictable means of administering 
justice-and suppresses our desire for someone to take responsibility for 
grave decisions that dramatically affect the lives of others. The 
suppression of one aspect of thought and the highlighting of the other is 
likely a result of the contradictory nature of the two ways of thinking. If 
the outcome of a legal question is predictable, the decision-maker bears 
little responsibility for it. But when individuals are responsible, their 
decisions are not necessarily predictable. Our attachment to both types 
of decision-making may explain why the Court has adopted doctrine that 
serves the suppressed goal of individual responsibility better than the 
goals that the Court has been ostensibly pursuing. 
A capital punishment system requires participants to play a role in a 
project-ending the life of another member of the society-that most of 
us would find inconceivable outside the system. In our everyday lives, 
most of us have mechanisms that preclude us from exercising excessive 
force against others, much less taking their lives. By contrast, Robert 
87. Havel himself recognizes that the specific problems he addresses in post-
totalitarian socialist society in eastern Europe are not different in basic form from those 
in western society. HAVEL, The Power, supra note 74, at 207-09. 
In a democracy, human beings may enjoy many personal freedoms and 
securities that are unknown to us, but in the end they do them no good, for they 
too are ultimately victims of the same automatism, and are incapable of 
defending their concerns about their own identity or preventing their 
superficialization or transcending concerns about their own personal survival 
to become proud and responsible members of the polis, making a genuine 
contribution to the creation of its destiny. 
Id. at 208; see HAVEL, Politics, supra note 74, at 263 ("It really is not all that important 
whether, by accident of domicile, we confront a Western manager or an Eastern 
bureaucrat in this very modest and yet globally crucial struggle against the momentum of 
impersonal power."). In particular, he criticizes modern democracies as "founded more 
on mistrust than mutual confidence, and more on collective irresponsibility than on 
responsibility." HAVEL, The Power, supra note 74, at 210-11. 
88. Havel described his conception of individual responsibility by analogizing it to 
Christianity-"not something partial" or accessible by only a few, but something 
universal and "potentially accessible to everyone." HAVEL, The Power, supra note 74, at 
194-96. "[T]hat arrogant self-projection [ of raising the consciousness of the masses] 
is ... intrinsic to an essentially different way of thinking, the kind that feels it has a 
patent on some ideal project and therefore that it has the right to impose it on society." 
Id. at 197. 
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Cover has explained that "[p]ersons who act within social organizations 
that exercise authority [such as criminal sentencing] act violently 
without experiencing the normal inhibitions or the normal degree of 
inhibition which regulates the behavior of those who act 
autonomously."89 As a practical matter, there is no alternative. If legal 
punishment is to be inflicted "safely and effectively," Cover argued, 
"responsibility for the violence must be shared; law must operate as a 
system of cues and signals to many actors who would otherwise be 
unwilling, incapable or irresponsible in their violent acts."90 
American legal theory emphasizes the desirable role of law in 
mediating individual behavior with social systems to procure 
evenhanded decisions, not influenced by conscious or unconscious 
prejudices that would likely sway more autonomous decisions. But 
there are certain decisions that are so intertwined with moral questions 
that decision-making according to the rule of law is unacceptable. Kent 
Greenawalt has argued: 
There are many fundamental questions of morality that are critical for the 
appropriate boundaries of legal protection for which rational secular morality 
cannot provide any single persuasive answer. . . . [In those cases,] every citizen 
must resolve [the question] on the basis of some nonrational judgment, a 
judgment that is not irrational or against reason, but which goes beyond what 
rationality can establish.91 
89. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1615 (1986). 
Craig Haney has made a similar point: 
To ensure its viability, the system of death sentencing in the United States 
depends on the creation of an extraordinary set of psychological conditions. 
These conditions must prevail in capital trials to facilitate or somehow 
"enable" the participation of ordinary people in a potentially deadly course of 
action. Since, under typical circumstances, a group of twelve law-abiding 
persons would not calmly, rationally, and seriously discuss the killing of 
another, or decide that the person in question should die and then take actions 
to bring about that death, this unique set of conditions is crucial to allow the 
death-sentencing process to go forward. 
Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and 
the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1447-48 (1997). 
90. Cover, supra note 89, at 1628. Those who argue that capital punishment 
would likely be impossible without mechanisms that insulate the participants from the 
violence of their decision may be missing this point. See Haney, supra note 89, at 1485-
86. All criminal sentencing would be impossible without legal mechanisms. But those 
mechanisms are not necessarily bad faith trickery. As Cover makes clear, they are 
integral to the performance of a social role. 
91. Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice: The General Justification 
Defense-Criteria for Political Action and the Duty to Obey the Law, 36 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1, 35 (1986). 
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Laura U nderkuffler has applied Greenawalt' s insights to capital 
punishment systems,92 arguing that individuals experience "conflict 
between our belief in the rule of law, under whose authority 
decisionmakers detachedly enforce law made by others," and our need in 
cases deeply intertwined with moral decisions for "a human being [to] 
be personally and morally responsible."93 She contends that modem 
doctrine may have developed in the way that it has because "the Court 
instinctively perceives" our social need for individually responsible 
decision-making even at the expense of "erratic judgments, standardless 
decisionmaking, and the use of factors that we-as a society-abhor. "94 
Greenawalt and Underkuffler see individual responsibility as a 
necessary element in legal decisions with serious moral underpinnings. 
But they view this necessary responsibility as compromising American 
ideals.95 The law, they contend, generally and desirably employs 
"rational processes" to reach an ex ante reproducible result that is 
supported by a social consensus.96 Introducing individual responsibility 
necessarily detracts from that process. Just as some of the justices and 
commentators see modem capital punishment doctrine as a zero sum 
92. See generally Laura S. Underkuftler, Agentic and Conscientic Decisions in 
Law: Death and Other Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713 (1999). While 
Underkuftler was concerned with capital punishment, there is at least some reason to 
believe that all criminal sentencing is subject to the same conflicts between our 
commitment to both a rule of Jaw and to individual responsibility for morally significant 
decisions. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 821 (1991) (commenting that criminal 
sentencing in the federal system had not historically been guided by the rule of law-"a 
judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to 
the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come"). 
93. Underkuftler, supra note 92, at 1735. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, in 
which the authors conclude: 
The moral quality of the capital sentencing decision depends on the sentencer 
believing she is responsible for the sentence. A sentencer who believes she 
alone bears responsibility for the defendant's fate will attend to her task with 
the requisite degree of moral seriousness, and a decision made without such 
seriousness is less reliable. If a sentencer believes, or has been led to believe, 
that she does not bear full responsibility, either because she can defer to 
another actor's prior decision or can delegate her sentencing authority to a 
subsequent actor in the process, then the reliability of the sentencer's decision 
is for that reason suspect. In our terminology, Caldwell insists that jurors 
understand and accept the role the Jaw assigns them as capital sentencers. 
Id. at 342-43. 
94. Underkuftler, supra note 92, at 1735 & n.95 ("[J]uries may nullify for bad 
reasons as well as good, and no one has yet thought of a formula that would produce 
nullification only in deserving cases." (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and 
Morality-Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REV. 177,230 (1981))). 
95. See generally Underkuftler, supra note 92, at 1713; Greenawalt, supra note 91, 
at 1. "With personal [autonomous, individually responsible] decision-making comes the 
danger of arbitrariness, the use of prohibited factors, and the violation of the very values that 
the law (as a consensual matter) has established." Underkufller, supra note 92, at 1719. 
96. Id. at 1720. 
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tradeoff between individualization and consistency, Greenawalt and 
Underkuffler appear to see a similar tradeoff between the morality of 
responsibility and the morality of evenhanded decision-making. 
Havel's individual-responsibility-driven social theory, by contrast, 
posits individually responsible decision-making, not as a necessary evil, 
but as a positive force for constructing a society's moral foundation. His 
vision, if extended to a capital punishment system, would require 
participants to engage both the defendant as a person and the values of 
the community in which the crime was committed. They would have to 
embrace, not just the circumstances of this crime, but also the 
defendant's character, past experience, and place in the community.97 
This process of engagement is central to each participant's role as a 
responsible citizen participating in an important social function. Their 
capacity to empathize with the defendant while understanding their 
community does not hinder reasoned decision-making or grant 
prejudices free play. On the contrary, it is enabling. Without empathy 
and understanding, there cannot be an engaged moral decision, and 
participants in the process would be little more than calculators-
weighing legal interests-with much less of a real stake in the 
decision.98 
Under Havel's approach, individual responsibility does not require us 
to compromise our commitment to rational decision-making. It simply 
keeps the scale from tipping too far toward the unexamined exercise of 
social violence. Cover correctly points out that law must displace, to 
some extent, the mechanisms that keep us from acting violently outside 
of legal systems if the system is to function. Embracing individual 
responsibility within the system does not transform the experience of 
criminal sentencing into the experience of actually treating another 
violently. It does serve as a necessarily minimal reminder or assurance 
that the participants understand that violence is indeed being done. 
97. Cf. Pillsbury, supra note 40, at 670, 677 (explaining that a proper evaluation of 
desert requires access to the sentencer's emotions, and that law generally assumes that 
individuals are responsible for how their emotions affect their decisions in contrast to the 
popular psychological view that emotions are events that simply happen to us and for 
which we have no responsibility). 
98. SCHAUER, supra note 46, at 145 ("[W]hen there are simply no rules to consult, 
the conscientious decision-maker looks at each decision-prompting event in as much 
relevant detail as the event offers."); West, supra note 51, at 91. 
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D. Modem Capital Punishment Doctrine and Responsibility Theory 
This subsection summarizes the Court's overly optimistic approach to 
responsibility and the commentators' overly skeptical view. It then 
describes how modem doctrine in fact heightens responsibility compared 
to pre-Furman doctrine. In particular, it shows how different aspects of 
the doctrine work to broaden the responsibility of different actors in the 
process, and it explains that complete discretion does not maximize 
responsibility because of the individual tendency to side step that 
responsibility. The appropriate role of doctrine is to create an 
environment in which discretionary decisions are worthy of trust. By 
combining structure and discretion, modem doctrine has taken a step in 
the right direction, however far it may remain from being a morally 
acceptable system. 
1. The Supreme Court's Discussion of Individual Responsibility 
The Supreme Court has had remarkably little to say about individual 
responsibility throughout the course of its doctrine-making cases. 
Justice Harlan's opinion in McGautha exhibited almost an absolute 
confidence in the ability of a sentencing jury to take individual 
responsibility for its decision. 
The States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome 
responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for 
the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety of factors, many 
of which will have been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments of 
defense counsel. 99 
Because no list of factors could ever be complete, any attempt to 
catalog them would inhibit the juror's ability to exercise their individual 
responsibility. And, given the "infinite variety of cases and facets to 
each case," Harlan wrote, general guidelines would amount to "either 
meaningless 'boiler-plate' or a statement of the obvious that no jury 
would need." 100 
While Harlan was correct to see the necessity of individual 
responsibility in capital sentencing, he failed to appreciate two important 
factors. First, capital sentencing involves numerous participants who 
should share responsibility. Even if discretionary jury sentencing of the 
type then employed fully tapped the responsibility of individual jurors, it 
did virtually nothing to ensure that other actors in the process-
particularly legislators, prosecutors, and appellate courts-took 
99. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971). 
100. Id. at 208. 
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individual responsibility for their roles. Second, the pre-Furman 
structure was actually unlikely to tap juror responsibility because of the 
tendency of individuals to deflect that burden. Law can be a device to 
focus responsibility, but as Justice Brennan pointed out in his McGautha 
dissent, pre-Furman law was "purposely constructed to allow the 
maximum possible variation from one case to the next."101 To be sure, 
Brennan may have been thinking about using rules to directly guide the 
jury's decision, rather than to heighten the jury's sense of responsibility 
and thereby better calibrate the juror's internal moral compass. But pre-
Furman law did neither. 
In its long series of post-McGautha, doctrine-building cases, the Court 
has said virtually nothing about individual responsibility. The one 
exception is Caldwell v. Mississippi, 102 in which the Court declared that 
its doctrine had "taken as a given that capital sentencers would view 
their task as the serious one of determining whether a specific human 
being should die at the hands of the State."103 Justice Marshall explained 
for the Court: 
Belief in the truth of the assumption that sentencers treat their power to 
determine the appropriateness of death as an "awesome responsibility" has 
allowed this Court to view sentencer discretion as consistent with-and indeed 
as indispensable to-the Eighth Amendment's "need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment .... "104 
By connecting sentencer discretion and responsibility with its own 
conception of reliability, Caldwell suggests that the Court may, at least 
momentarily, have understood the role of individual responsibility as 
Havel did: A responsible sentencing decision is-because it is 
responsible-an appropriate sentencing decision. There is no external 
measuring rod. The scale is the heart of the decision-maker. 
But even in Caldwell, the Court appeared to see the role of law as 
merely ensuring that individual jurors were not led astray by improper 
argument or instructions. As in McGautha, there is no sense of the 
possibility that law could work to heighten the responsibility of all actors 
in the system or that law was needed to aid jurors in focusing their 
responsibility in every case, not just in those where a prosecutor or trial 
judge said something improper. 
101. Id. at 248. 
102. 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
103. Id. at 329. 
104. Id. at 329-30 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)). 
111 
In any event, Caldwell is a lone voice in the wind. In numerous cases, 
the Court has stressed the role of modem doctrine in directly dictating 
the outcome of capital sentencing decisions in precisely the ways that 
would tend to reduce a juror's sense of responsibility. 105 Caldwell itself 
has been interpreted quite narrowly to prohibit only inaccurate 
statements that tend to lessen the jury's sense ofresponsibility. 106 This 
emphasis on improving the accuracy of the inputs, rather than freeing the 
minds of the jurors from devices that would deflect their sense of 
responsibility, suggests that the Court now sees Caldwell very 
differently than did the original Caldwell majority. By stressing that 
discretion was essential to reliability, Justice Marshall's majority 
opinion in Caldwell appreciated the juror as an empathetic human being 
capable of making a morally acceptable sentencing decision. The 
Court's later emphasis on accuracy harkens instead to a sentencer 
engaged in a mechanical calculus where we need only ensure that the 
correct inputs are plugged into the calculator. 107 
105. See, e.g, Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 362 (1993) ("States are free to 
structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence 'in an effort to achieve a more 
rational and equitable administration of the death penalty."' (quoting Boyde v. 
California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990))); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990) ("It 
would be very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the fate of a defendant to tum on the 
vagaries of particular jurors' emotional sensitivities with our longstanding recognition 
that, above all, capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and nonarbitrary."); 
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990) (holding that a state may require the 
sentencer to impose a death sentence where aggravating evidence outweighs mitigating 
evidence); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality) ("Given the 
awesome power that a sentencing jury must exercise in a capital case, it may be 
advisable for a State to provide the jury with some framework for discharging these 
responsibilities."). 
106. Justice O'Connor stressed in a concurring opinion the important-to her 
mind-fact that the prosecutor had misled the jury to believe that the Mississippi 
appellate court had more discretion to review a death sentence than it actually had. 
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342. Where the plurality suggested that any statement about 
appellate review would be problematic, she stressed that an accurate instruction on the 
role of appellate courts would not. Id. In Romano v. Oklahoma, a five to four majority 
held that introducing evidence that the defendant had been sentenced to death in another 
case did not violate Caldwell. 512 U.S. 1 (1994). Whether it lessened the juror's 
individual responsibility was irrelevant because the information was accurate at the time 
it was presented to the jury. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that 
"[t]he inaccuracy of the prosecutor's argument in Caldwell was essential to [her] 
conclusion that the argument was unconstitutional. . . . An accurate description of the 
jury's role --even one that lessened the jury's sense of responsibility-would have been 
constitutional." Id. at 14; see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 258 (1990) (holding 
that Caldwell error is not sufficiently fundamental to justify retroactive application); 
Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 408-10 (1989) (refusing to apply Caldwell where 
defendant failed to object on state law grounds in a pre-Caldwell case). 
107. Even the initial interpretation of Caldwell has been criticized for assuming that 
jurors will accept an appropriate level of responsibility unless they are misguided by the 
prosecutor or the court. In fact, jurors may seek out ways to avoid responsibility unless 
they are affirmatively told that they must bear it. See Hoffman, supra note 70, at 1138. 
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2. Academic Analysis of Modem Doctrine in Terms of Individual 
Responsibility 
To the extent that commentators have written about individual 
responsibility in capital sentencing, they have focused almost 
exclusively on the ultimate sentencer, usually the jury, and they have 
assumed that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of 
rationality or guidance in the process and the degree of sentencer 
responsibility. For these commentators, individual sentencer 
responsibility was at its zenith in the pre-Furman period, and any 
movement towards a more reasoned sentencing process in the post-
Furman statutes necessarily lessens jury responsibility.108 They see 
legal guidance as a crutch on which sentencers may lean to avoid 
directly facing the decision for which they should take individual 
responsibility. For example, a juror might seek to escape the moral 
burden by reasoning: "I did not decide that a death sentence was 
appropriate here; under the law, I had no choice." 
These commentators typically ignore modem doctrine's 
individualized sentencing requirements because, by definition, that 
doctrine is more legalistic in form than pre-Furman practice. That very 
form enables a sentencer to displace individual responsibility by 
deferring to the law. 
Modem doctrine, however, recognizes that either clear, strict rules or 
absolute, unfettered discretion would leave too much leeway for actors 
in the process to lessen their sense of responsibility. If the system is too 
rule-like, decision-makers can hide behind the law.109 If the system is 
108. For example, Professor Hoffmann questioned whether modern Eighth 
Amendment doctrine should be reconsidered because it might be impossible 
to give a "little" guidance ... without the jurors mistakenly concluding that 
they are getting a "lot'' of guidance, and thus avoiding their personal moral 
responsibility for the sentencing decision[.] 
. . . Perhaps our attempts to create "rationality'' from within, by drafting lists 
of "aggravators" and "mitigators," merely permit the jury to conclude that 
there is a legally "correct" answer to the sentencing question. 
Hoffmann, supra note 70, at 1159. Professor Sherman similarly contends that "the 
setting of rules and guidelines ... may have an additional (and perhaps unintended) 
effect on the degree of responsibility experienced by the jurors. . . . The clearer the 
guided discretion, the more likely it is that jurors can place responsibility for their 
sentencing decision on the law and its requirements." Sherman, supra note 50, at 1244; 
see Weisberg, supra note 39, at 391-95. 
109. SCHAUER, supra note 46, at 145-46. 
[W]hen a decision-maker decides according to rules and therefore relies on 
decisions made by others, she is partially freed from the responsibility of 
113 
too open-ended, decision-makers can divert responsibility with rules of 
thumb of their own making. Religious and social practice provide an 
array of rationalizations to which a sentencer could tum for help in 
making the difficult sentencing choice. At a loss for guidance, the logic 
of an eye-for-an-eye may have powerful appeal. 110 Both types of 
systems would enable actors throughout the process to take the easy way 
out and escape the strain of an individually responsible decision. 
3. The Ways in Which Modern Doctrine Fosters Responsibility 
Compared to pre-Furman practice, modem doctrine heightens the 
sense of responsibility of participants at each level in the sentencing 
process-legislator, prosecutor, sentencer (jury or judge), and appellate 
court. The degree of responsibility may remain less, perhaps far less, 
than optimal, but it is better. Part IV of this Article addresses the 
additional benefits that could be obtained by explicitly focusing on 
individual responsibility as the goal of capital punishment doctrine. 
a. The Legislator's Responsibility 
Before Furman, the individual legislator had virtually no 
responsibility at all. A statute declared murder-and perhaps rape-to 
be crimes potentially punishable by death. But murder and rape 
themselves were defined by the most uncertain concepts in criminal 
law-malice, premeditation, and consent-and the death penalty was 
simply available for all, but rarely imposed on any, murderers and 
rapists. m As a result, any individual legislator could disclaim 
responsibility for the death penalty simply by focusing on the absolute 
discretion placed in the hands of the jury. 112 
Id. 
scrutinizing every substantively relevant feature of the event. . . . [W]hen a 
decision-maker follows a rule she no longer examines every facet of the 
decision-prompting event with the same degree of care she would have 
employed had there been no rules. . . . At times a rule removes so many 
factors from consideration that a decision-maker may relax almost completely, 
making decisions that require virtually no effort whatsoever. 
I IO. A Gallup Poll released on March 2, 2001, indicated that nearly half of those 
who supported the death penalty gave "an eye for an eye" as the basis for their belief. 
The Gallup Organization, Death Penalty: Why Do You Favor the Death Penalty for 
Persons Convicted of Murder?, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/ inddeath_pen. 
asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2001); see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: 
Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. I 043, 1072 (1995) 
(discussing how jurors who Jack understanding of their role tend to resort to familiar 
concepts to define the basis for their decision). 
111. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 ( 1972) (White, J., concurring). 
112. Justice White's concurrence in Funnan rested at least in part on the 
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Today, state legislatures must enact a carefully crafted law that 
requires the prosecution to prove something beyond murder before the 
defendant will be eligible for the death penalty. That something may 
involve aggravating factors about the crime (for example, the victim was 
a police officer) or the defendant's character (a history of prior violent 
felony convictions for instance). To be sure, a legislature can draft a 
death penalty statute with a list of aggravating factors that is sufficiently 
extensive to cover a very high percentage of murders. But an individual 
legislator must consider whether each circumstance chosen is 
sufficiently egregious to distinguish a defendant who fits the category 
from a generic murderer who does not. Forcing the legislator to face the 
question, "Does a defendant to whom this particular circumstance 
applies potentially deserve to die," meaningfully ratchets up the level of 
responsibility that must be taken by legislators supporting a capital 
sentencing law when compared to the pre-Furman process. 
b. The Prosecutor's Responsibility 
Like the legislator, the pre-Furman prosecutor had little to think 
about. The defendant was prosecuted for murder or rape. While the 
prosecutor was free subtly to persuade or dissuade the jury from 
imposing a death sentence, nothing in the law required that prosecutor to 
take any stance whatsoever. Like the legislator, the prosecutor could 
leave all responsibility to the jury. A prosecutor might have taken 
adequate responsibility-and surely many did-but pre-Furman doctrine 
did not require or encourage that sort of responsible behavior. It was 
purely a matter of individual choice. 
Under the post-Furman regime, prosecutors in many jurisdictions 
must select the aggravating circumstances on which to rely in a separate 
sentencing proceeding. Additionally, in all jurisdictions, the prosecutor 
must stand before the sentencer and say that this defendant is 
distinguished from others by specific aggravating criteria that make 
death an appropriate punishment, not just that the defendant committed 
murder. To be sure, the legislature has chosen that criteria, but the 
prosecutor cannot escape responsibility for at least two reasons. First, 
legislature's lack of responsibility for death sentences that were imposed. Id. at 314 
("Legislative 'policy' is thus necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized 
but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon 
them."). 
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many of the aggravating circumstances do not involve black and white 
issues. The prosecutor thus bears responsibility for (1) deciding whether 
to rely on them, and (2) convincing the jury that they apply. Second, 
given the doctrine permitting the defendant to introduce mitigating 
evidence, the prosecutor must go beyond merely proving the aggravating 
factors chosen by the legislature and must explain why, despite the 
proffered mitigating evidence, death is appropriate. 113 
Modem doctrine grants significant discretion to the prosecutor. But 
that discretion is appropriate because it ensures that the prosecutor faces 
a choice for which individual responsibility must be taken. Requiring 
the prosecutor to make that grave choice in a way that Furman's 
prosecutor could avoid is an important way in which modem doctrine 
heightens responsibility. 114 
c. The Sentencer's (Jury's or Trial Judge's) Responsibility 
Unlike the legislator and prosecutor, who have been all but completely 
ignored by those who have thought about the importance of 
responsibility in capital sentencing, there has been serious discussion of 
the level of responsibility assumed by the sentencer, at least when a jury 
113. Statistical analysis supports the conclusion that prosecutors exercise significant 
discretion in determining cases in which the death penalty will be sought. For example, 
prosecutors in different cities operating under the same state law often have vastly 
different practices and records in capital cases. Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death 
Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: International Nonns, 
Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 WIS. L. 
REv. 1, 15-16 (relating the example that Houston district attorneys seek and obtain far 
more death sentences than Dallas district attorneys, even though Dallas has a higher 
murder rate); see LIFfON & MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 4 ("Even within the same state, 
procedures for prosecuting capital cases vary from county to county."). 
114. James Liebman's important and recent article identifies a disturbing incentive 
structure for prosecutors that tends to encourage them to pursue death sentences for 
political purposes without sufficient regard for whether the sentence is appropriate. 
Liebman, supra note 4, at 2100-01. His argument, however, does not undermine the 
contention made here that prosecutors have more individual responsibility under modern 
doctrine than they did pre-Furman. Moreover, he correctly identifies the appropriate 
solution as procedural requirements designed to better focus and clarify the prosecutor's 
individual responsibility rather than a wooden checklist that would blunt prosecutorial 
discretion by blinding them to the uniqueness of particular cases. 
The prosecutor must wait 120 days after indictment before announcing a 
decision to prosecute the case capitally, at which time the lead prosecutor on 
any case charged capitally must file a report with the district attorney, the state 
attorney general, and the defense, justifying the capital charge. The report 
must identify the facts making the offense death-eligible under state and 
federal constitutional law, the aggravating circumstances to which the state 
will be limited at trial, the reasons why the level of aggravation net of 
mitigation warrants a death sentence, and the evidence warranting near-
certainty on each of those points. 
Id. at 2144--45. 
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does the sentencing. As described above, this analysis tends to 
emphasize how much responsibility was placed in the hands of the juror 
pre-Furman. For example, pre-Furman jury instructions often stressed 
that "whether you recommend or withhold mercy is a matter solely 
within your discretion."115 Also, jurors were often told not to be guided 
by sympathy or other factors that might serve "as a means of escaping a 
hard or disagreeable duty."116 
While the unguided discretion fostered by instructions of this type 
may theoretically maximize the sentencer's responsibility, it also leaves 
the sentencer wholly unfettered in its ability to belittle the responsibility 
it has. For example, a juror could easily rely on the lex talionis and say: 
"this man committed murder, he deserves to die."117 And this 
responsibility-escaping potential is not one-sided. A juror might 
similarly reason something like: "Jesus preached forgiveness so I will 
vote for life."118 In both examples, responsibility could be transferred 
from the individual juror to the Bible without violating the jury's 
instructions. 119 
No doubt, some jurors took their roles seriously in the pre-Furman 
era. But many probably did not. The psychological literature indicates 
that individuals faced with grave decisions will (1) look for ways to 
escape responsibility, and (2) revert to ingrained decision-making forms 
when they are uncertain of the rules they should follow. 120 Those 
115. State v. Caldwell, 21 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ohio 1939); see People v. Friend, 306 
P.2d 463,474 (Cal. 1957) ("[T]he law does not itself prescribe, nor authorize the court to 
innovate, any rule circumscribing the exercise of their discretion, but, rather, commits 
the whole matter of its exercise to the judgment and the consciences of the jury .... "). 
116. Caldwell, 21 N.E.2d at 344. 
117. Exodus 21:23-25 ("[T]hou shalt give life for life, [e]ye for eye, tooth for tooth, 
hand for hand, foot for foot, [b ]urning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."). 
118. Matthew 5:38-39 ("Ye have heard that it hath been said, [a]n eye for an eye, 
and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, [t]hat ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall 
smite thee on thy right cheek, turn on him the other also."). 
119. While religion does not provide the only means for side-stepping individual 
responsibility, it is a particularly common example as evidenced by the regular use of 
religious analogy by both prosecuting and defense attorneys arguing capital cases. John 
H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Don't Take His Eye, Don't Take His Tooth, and Don't 
Cast the First Stone: Limiting Religious Arguments in Capital Cases, 9 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 61, 64-74 (2000) (cataloging religious analogies employed by prosecutors 
and defense counsel in capital cases). 
120. See Bowers, supra note 110, at 1072 & nn.159-60; Peter Meijes Tiersma, 
Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 
1, 12 ("[E]vidence, supported by common sense, [indicates] that when jurors do not 
understand instructions, they simply rely on their own rough notions of justice."); supra 
117 
findings strongly suggest that most jurors probably did not accept the 
responsibility that pre-Furman doctrine purported to give them. 
Just as commentators addressing responsibility in capital sentencing 
tend to romanticize the level of responsibility accepted by the unfettered 
juror, they tend to demonize modern doctrine for providing guidance. 
Commentators fear that the legalistic process now governing both the 
findings necessary to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty and 
the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors enables jurors to pass 
responsibility to the legislature for the ultimate sentencing decision. The 
legislature put the sentencing scheme in place, this argument runs, and 
must take responsibility for its outcome. The sentencer's job is merely 
to apply the rules adopted by someone else. 121 
While this interpretation of the effect of modern doctrine is plausible 
as far as it goes, it provides too narrow an account. The death eligibility 
finding under modern doctrine is, to be sure, a legalistic enterprise, but 
no more so than the finding that the defendant was guilty of murder in 
the pre-Furman era. Under both types of regimes, sentencers were 
required to make certain structured findings before considering whether 
the defendant should die. Whatever impact adding this second legalistic 
exercise might have on sentencer responsibility, however, is entirely 
undone by the other aspect of modern doctrine that mandates a separate 
sentencing trial at which mitigating evidence is presented.122 
As an initial matter, the mere existence of the separate trial to consider 
the sentence helps undermine the simplest defense mechanism that a 
sentencer may employ: the rule of thumb that all murderers deserve to be 
executed. Pre-Furman law-at least in states without separate 
sentencing proceedings-permitted that sort of simplistic reasoning. 
Modern doctrine does not. Jurors surely must understand that if murder 
alone were enough to render a defendant deserving of death, there would 
be little need for an entirely separate proceeding. 
Second, and more important, modern doctrine requires that the 
sentencer consider, and be permitted to give effect to, all evidence 
offered by the defendant that might serve as a basis for a sentence less 
than death. 123 An unfettered juror could, without violating the oath, 
notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
121. See Weisberg, supra note 39, at 376-79. "The formal, legalistic image of the 
law of capital punishment that the jury now receives from the court and the prosecutor is 
often a great advantage to the state." Id. at 383; see also Pillsbury, supra note 40, at 667. 
122. The benefit of a legalistic death-eligibility finding is that it heightens the level 
of responsibility that must now be accepted by the legislator. See supra Part III.D.3.a. 
123. Pillsbury, supra note 40, at 658 (recognizing that the "Supreme Court has 
made significant efforts to protect the [juror's] opportunity to empathize in its capital 
jurisprudence, but has failed to see the need to affirmatively encourage sentencer 
empathy"). 
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ignore the defendant's character, background, and even role in the crime 
and rely instead on a socially- or religiously-driven rule of thumb that 
murder justifies a death sentence. Where there are no standards, there 
are no roadblocks preventing the free play of psychological defense 
mechanisms that enable us to avoid difficult decisions. Modern doctrine 
closes that door by commanding that the sentencer consider each and 
every mitigating circumstance and then decide-with full power to give 
effect to the mitigating evidence-whether the death penalty is 
appropriate. The buck stops there. A finding of murder, or even 
sufficient aggravating circumstances to make ·the defendant death-
eligible-two decisions for which responsibility could be passed to the 
legislature-are simply not enough. While not eliminating a sentencer' s 
ability to belittle its own responsibility by employing rules of thumb, 
modern doctrine goes to great lengths to discourage the juror from doing 
so.124 
d. The Reviewing Court's Responsibility 
Commentators and the Court have recognized the possibility that 
appellate review may undermine the sentencer' s sense of 
responsibility.125 There has been little discussion, however, of the extent 
to which appellate court judges bear individual responsibility for death 
124. All this is not to say that, as a practical matter, sentencers today necessarily 
accept a greater degree of responsibility for their decisions than they did in the pre-
Funnan era. By the 1950s, some states employed separate sentencing proceedings and 
some trial judges permitted defendants to introduce mitigating evidence, even at the guilt 
phase, that would not be appropriate in noncapital cases. By contrast, today's sentencing 
juries are instructed in a variety of ways that may overemphasize the legalistic aspects of 
modern doctrine and confuse, if not ignore, the responsibility-enhancing aspects of 
modern doctrine. The Court has been at best inconsistent in its enforcement of its own 
doctrine. Compare Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1920-24 (2001) (striking down a 
death sentence where the instructions likely confused the jury about its ability to give 
effect to mitigating evidence) with Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) 
(upholding a death sentence despite the absence of instruction on how the jury could give 
effect to mitigating evidence). This shortcoming, however, arises from the inappropriate 
goals that the Court continues to pursue rather than the structure of the doctrine itself. 
States struggling to apply capital sentencing systems that are both fully consistent and 
fully individuating not surprisingly give short shrift to the aspects of doctrine that 
empower sentencers to give effect to mitigating evidence without meaningful guidance 
from the legislature. The Court's own inconsistent enforcement efforts are also likely 
confounded by its mistaken pursuit of meaningless goals. A proper focus on heightening 
individual responsibility as the goal of modern doctrine would dramatically improve the 
application of that doctrine. See infra Part IV. 
125. See supra Part III.D.1-2. 
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sentences. 
In the pre-Furman era, appellate courts played no role whatsoever in 
capital sentencing decisions. Juries had complete discretion and were 
not subject to any form of appellate review. 
Modem doctrine, by contrast, has emphasized the importance of 
appellate review. While the Court has not imposed a generally 
applicable standard of review in capital cases, it has suggested that some 
form of meaningful review is required. 126 In addition, the Court has 
demanded careful review when state appellate courts seek to save death 
sentences where the trial-level sentencer's decision is tainted by error. 
The state court must either reweigh the aggravating and mitigating 
evidence for itself, or apply a rigorous beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test to 
determine whether the error was harmless. The Court has rejected 
simplistic devices that might enable an appellate court to affirm death 
sentences without taking sufficient responsibility for the result. For 
example, the Court prohibited a state court from automatically affirming 
a capital sentence whenever the defendant was eligible for the death 
penalty. 127 
E. Evaluating the Empirical Critique of Responsibility Theory 
Independent researchers have interviewed small numbers of capital 
jurors, and the Capital Jury Project coordinated a multistate effort to 
interview 80 to 120 jurors from each of fourteen death penalty states. 
The interviewed jurors in the latter project were about equally divided 
between juries returning death sentences and life sentences. 128 While 
126. See infra Part IV.B.l. 
127. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752 (1990). An additional part of the 
capital sentencing process, clemency procedures, has been relatively unaffected by 
modem capital sentencing doctrine. But even here, there has been some change for the 
better. Before Funnan, the clemency procedure was generally unregulated. While that 
is still largely true, the Court has indicated that some due process safeguards must be 
applied to clemency procedures. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 
289 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating the opinion of four justices that "some 
minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings"); id. at 290 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that due process applies to clemency 
proceedings); see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-18 (1986) (establishing that 
clemency procedures are required where a death row inmate claims that his execution 
should be barred because he is insane). If a death row inmate is insane, due process 
requires that he have the right to demonstrate that fact. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-18. A 
governor is also likely to be required to hear evidence suggesting that an execution 
would be morally wrong, and take account of it, before denying clemency. By requiring 
the governor to provide some process, the clemency process too has become a more 
responsible one. 
128. Bowers, supra note 110, at 1043; id. at 1073 (describing earlier independent 
studies in California, Florida, and Oregon); Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, at 350 
(drawing on data from South Carolina juries); Hoffmann, supra note 70, at 1138 
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data of this type is inherently difficult to interpret, on the whole it 
supports two general conclusions: (1) jurors tend to misunderstand 
capital sentencing instructions particularly in the areas where the 
instructions diverge from the jurors' expectations; and (2) while jurors 
seek ways to lessen their responsibility, modem doctrine works against 
that tendency and may help-albeit marginally at present-to foster 
individual responsibility among jurors. 129 These findings confirm work 
from various disciplines showing that when jurors are uncertain about 
their task, they revert to concepts that they understand-such as the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and unanimity.130 
The Capital Jury Project interviews suggest that a minority of jurors 
assume, for example, that they are required to impose a death sentence if 
certain aggravating circumstances are proven Gust as they are required to 
find the defendant guilty if certain facts are proven).131 The interviews 
also suggest that jurors tend to misunderstand unusual aspects of the 
capital sentencing process-particularly the role of mitigating 
evidence-that differ markedly from the decision process at the guilt 
phase.132 
Several commentators have interpreted the Capital Jury Project data as 
confirming their fear that modem doctrine "allay[s] jurors' sense of 
responsibility for their life or death sentencing decisions by appearing to 
(drawing on data from Indiana juries); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in 
Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1161 (1995) 
(drawing on data from North Carolina juries). 
129. A pre-Capital Jury Project study indicated that sentencing schemes in states 
like Texas and Oregon-where jurors are asked to answer a short list of questions, rather 
than weigh circumstances-may contribute to reducing the jurors sense of responsibility. 
For example, one juror commented: "We are not sentencing him to death-we are just 
answering these questions." Bowers, supra note 110, at 1076. But these sorts of statutes 
actually violate modern doctrine to the extent that they do not require full and careful 
consideration of mitigating evidence and a reasonable means to give effect to that 
evidence. The Court recently reiterated this point. Penry, 121 S. Ct. at 1920-21. 
130. Bowers, supra note 110, at 1072 & n.159 ("Uncertainty about how to proceed 
may cause jurors to 'invent' their own rules or understandings about how the sentencing 
task should be performed."). 
131. Although "a substantial majority of jurors did not believe that the law required 
a death sentence even if they believed the evidence proved heinousness or 
dangerousness," the data shows that "[n]early one-third of the jurors were under the 
mistaken impression that the law required a death sentence if they found heinousness or 
dangerousness, a result replicated in a multi-state study of the interview data." 
Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, at 360; see Bowers, supra note 110, at 1091; Luginbuhl 
& Howe, supra note 128, at 1173-75. 
132. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 128, at 1165-71. 
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provide them with an authoritative formula that yields the 'correct' or 
'required' punishment."133 But the results are far from clear. 
Commentators note, with some alarm, that jurors express discomfort 
with their responsibility. 134 Those responses, however, could just as 
easily be viewed positively: they confirm that jurors do sense that an 
immense responsibility rests with them. The more important issue is 
whether modern doctrine helps or hinders the jurors in their effort to 
avoid responsibility. To answer that question, commentators point to a 
high percentage of jurors who reported that the defendant or the law-
rather than the jury or individual jurors-were most responsible for the 
death sentence. 135 While it is conceivable that these jurors were seeking 
to reduce their own responsibility, the answers more likely indicate that 
the jurors recognized that a death sentence should be imposed only 
where the defendant deserves it, and that capital sentencing is part of the 
legal system and would not exist outside of the law. These are correct 
and unavoidable assumptions that likely have little bearing on the jurors' 
actual feelings of responsibility for their decision. 136 
Lawyers tend to think of responsibility as we think of water in a 
bucket. If we assign some responsibility to one person Gust as if we 
ladle out some water), we necessarily have less responsibility (water) to 
assign someone else. This way of thinking about responsibility is 
atypical. Responsibility usually connects an individual to a decision or 
action. That attribution need not be affected in any way by another 
individual's connection to the same decision or action. 137 A defendant, 
the law, and the juror may thus all be responsible for a death sentence. 
133. Bowers, supra note 110, at 1093. 
134. Hoffmann, supra. note 70, at 1142-43. "The jurors overall did not want to be 
responsible for making the decision of the death penalty." Id. at 1142. The jurors "had a 
problem with being responsible for giving that verdict;" one juror prayed for guidance to 
"tell me what to do, because ... I remember not feelin' sure ifl could do it." Id. at 1143. 
135. Bowers, supra note 110, at 1094 (stating that eighty percent of jurors 
responded "that the defendant or the law [was] most responsible .... "); Eisenberg et al., 
supra note 51, at 354-58. Others have speculated that the relatively low number of 
executions may lessen the jurors' sense of responsibility. Id. at 352 ("[J]urors' 
knowledge that executions occur infrequently may unavoidably diminish their sense of 
causal responsibility."). Of course, the number of executions has increased dramatically 
in recent years. LIFfON & MITCHELL, supra note 6, at xi ("More inmates were executed 
in our country in 1999 than in any year since 1952, and the execution rate has soared 800 
percent in the past decade."). 
136. Valerie P. Hans, How Juries Decide Death: The Contributions of the Capital 
Jury Project, 70 IND. L.J. 1233, 1237 (1995); Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, at 352 
( distinguishing the concept of "role responsibility" from "causal responsibility"). 
137. Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death 
Penalty Cases from the I989 Tenn, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 177 (1990) 
(explaining how recognizing social responsibility for war crimes or violent criminal 
behavior "would diminish the responsibility ... not one bit" of the particular criminals 
who committed the acts). 
122 
[VOL. 39: 79, 2002] Responsibility in Capital Sentencing 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Another question from the Capital Jury Project interviews focused on 
the jury's responsibility vis-a-vis the judge and appellate courts. In 
response to this question, more than half of the jurors answered that they 
were solely or mostly responsible. 138 And, most jurors report that they 
did not simply count up factors and weigh them in a mechanical way. 139 
Perhaps even more telling are the narrative answers of jurors suggesting 
that the doctrine reinforced, or at least did not detract from, their 
inherent understanding that they were responsible. 140 As three 
commentators on the Capital Jury Project data concluded: "The 
'average' juror is not the juror the Milgram model would lead us to 
138. Bowers, supra note 110, at 1096; Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, at 354-58. 
139. Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, at 366. 
140. Hoffmann, supra note 70, at 1143. Examples of juror statements include: (1) 
"[W]e all knew that that was a big responsibility''; (2) "[W]e ... were allowing ourselves 
the right to make that [life or death] decision, and that each of us had that right, you 
know, and that responsibility"; and (3) "Nothing came close to this, the feeling of the 
responsibility .... " Id. Another juror explained: 
I told [the other jurors], "Put the kid in the chair. Now would you go up there 
[and] throw the switch yourself?" They said, "Well that's not my job." I said, 
"You are doing your job now. If you say go ahead, that's the same as [if] you 
are doing it. Before you do this, make sure that you can sleep tonight or next 
week or the rest of your life with what you've done." 
Id. at 1146. Another juror reported: "I don't think I was aware of a conscious fear of not 
applying the law correctly. I think I was more aware of just doing the right-what I 
thought, in my heart, was the right thing to do." Id. at 1152; see Hans, supra note 136, at 
1236 (explaining that the interviews show how ''.jurors struggle with their own 
responsibility for executing another"); Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, at 352 ("[M]ost 
jurors accept role responsibility for sentencing."). 
Interviews suggesting a lack of responsibility usually involved subjective judgment by 
a juror based on the appearance of other jurors rather than a confession about the 
interviewee's own state of mind. Hoffmann, supra note 70, at 1143 ("[l]t bothered me 
that people were so casual with that kind of responsibility."). There were some, 
however, who may have interpreted their instructions as dictating their decision: "I had a 
feeling he was giving us a procedure and we needed to go through these certain steps. 
And then if all the pieces fit, then you have a responsibility to come back with a death 
sentence." Id. at 1152. 
Interviews did suggest that jury instructions in states using juries merely to provide 
sentencing recommendations to judges may tend to lessen the juror's individual 
responsibility or permit the majority to sway a holdout juror in favor of a death sentence. 
Id. at 1147-51; Hans, supra note 136, at 1238. But if the trial judge who serves as the 
actual sentencer makes an independent sentencing decision, the jury in fact does not have 
much, if any, responsibility for the ultimate decision. 
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expect to find; he is closer to the juror portrayed in the Caldwell 
model." 141 
F. Evaluating the Radical Subjectivism Critique of 
Responsibility Theory 
A likely cnt1c1sm of an individual-responsibility-based theory of 
capital punishment would portray it as radically subjectivist, substituting 
the fickle moral judgment of individuals for the firmer moral judgment 
of society. 142 Margaret Radin, for example, correctly points out that 
"some opinions ... [are] morally wrong" and that "I want this" or "We 
[some of us] want this" does not equate to "This is morally justified."143 
The critique fails, however, because it posits a false dichotomy between 
a firm social morality and ungrounded private morality. On the one 
hand, social morality is no more than the morality of the individuals in 
141. Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, at 368. The Milgram model postulates an 
individual willing to cast aside individual responsibility to follow the instructions of an 
authority figure. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. The Capital Jury Project 
showed that jurors did not fit this model. 
In summary, responses to several different interview questions suggest a 
relatively consistent picture of juror sentencing responsibility. The "average" 
juror understands and accepts the key role he plays in determining the 
defendant's sentencing; does not view the law as forcing him to reach a 
particular sentence; does not view a death decision as something that the courts 
will likely reverse; and finds his service on a capital jury emotionally 
upsetting. On the other hand, he does not think it very likely that any death 
sentence he imposes will actually ever be carried out. Finally, although in 
arriving at a sentence he probably added up and weighed aggravating and 
mitigating factors, it is unclear that he did so in a fashion which would 
undermine his responsibility for the sentence imposed. Together, these 
responses suggest that the "average" juror felt a reasonably firm sense of role 
responsibility for the sentence he imposed. 
Eisenberg et al., supra note 51 at 367-68. 
142. Margaret Radin has argued: 
Because of the comparative view of proportionality and desert required by 
equal respect for persons, and because of the allocation of risk of error also 
required by equal respect for persons, no one can deserve to die when the issue 
of whether anyone can (ideally) deserve to die is morally uncertain and when 
in any event it is certain that we cannot select out all and only those who 
deserve to die. 
Margaret Jane Radin, Proportionality, Subjectivity, and Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1165, 1172 (1985). Scott Howe has attacked the Court's doctrine for implicitly 
assuming that there can be some form of social consensus on what deserts are just in 
particular cases. Without an articulated standard, he contends, a discretionary system 
can reduce arbitrariness only if one applies "the unlikely assumption that all capital 
sentencers would intuitively know and apply an unarticulated substantive standard." 
Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 408 
(2001). 
143. Radin, supra note 142, at 1171. 
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the society. It cannot be more firmly grounded. On the other hand, 
individual morality can rest on much firmer ground than subjective 
whim.144 
The issue is not moral certainty, but moral trust.145 We may not trust 
ourselves to make moral decisions by plebiscite, 146 yet we may accept 
our ability to do it as part of a carefully constructed judicial process. But 
even the structure of a trial may not be enough. Individuals faced with 
morally difficult choices may see themselves as-in Stanley Milgram' s 
words-"agent[s] for executing the wishes of another person. . . . In this 
condition the individual no longer views himself as responsible for his 
own actions but defines himself as an instrument for carrying out the 
wishes of others."147 The responsibility theory thus posits that capital 
punishment doctrine should create an environment in which we can trust 
the decisions of each participant in the process, not just the ultimate 
sentencer, by rendering the decisionmaking process of each one very, 
very hard. 148 "The call for something more reassuring-a verifiable 
formula of moral decision that prescribes future choices[,]" Professor 
Weisberg concludes, "comes not from moral philosophy, but from the 
need of the 'public order' for political symbols of rationality."149 
Creating a position of trust can be thought of as fostering the 
conditions under which individuals can tap into a moral grounding to 
144. As Robert Weisberg has observed, moral choice is more art than science. 
Weisberg, supra note 39, at 312 ("For [Harlan], a properly skeptical understanding of the 
law recognizes two things: first, that many legal decisions cannot be described in or 
reduced to precise legal language, and second, that those decisions are not for that reason 
alone arbitrary or irrational."). 
145. CJ. Jmrn RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (positing that 
individuals in a presocial state would make moral choices). 
146. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT 229, 236-37 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 
1993) (reporting that when responding to a question from the Court during the oral 
argument in Gregg v. Georgia, Anthony Amsterdam argued that neither a public opinion 
pole nor a plebiscite would be an adequate gauge of the mores of a society, but the Court 
could nonetheless exercise moral judgment within the structure of the judicial process). 
147. STANLEYMiLGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 133-
34 (1974). 
148. One capital juror interviewed about his experience described the jurors' initial 
frustrations over learning that a defendant they had just sentenced to death had 
previously been convicted of another murder. One juror was described as saying, "if we 
would have known this before, this whole thing would have been so easy." The 
interviewee reported that the judge responded, ''That's why we don't tell you. We want 
to make it difficult We want to make it fair for him." Hoffmann, supra note 70, at 
1155. 
149. Weisberg, supra note 39, at 395. 
125 
which they have innate access. 150 John Rawls draws a useful 
comparison between the moral sense that we develop and act upon as 
part of being a participant in a society and the ability of a native speaker 
of a language to formulate grammatically correct sentences. In each 
case, we have the skill and use it constantly. Yet, we find describing 
how we do it difficult, if not impossible. 151 
There are two ways in which this innate ability may work. At the 
root, the decision may be intuitive. 152 Both the heinous nature of a 
particular crime and the background of the defendant may be relevant to 
the capital sentencing decision. There is no method of valuing and 
balancing these factors logically. Instead, we must tum to intuition. The 
idea is not that we simply have the power to intuit morally correct 
decisions without working at it; rather, we have the ability, by reflecting 
on our initial intuitive judgments, to take account of morally relevant 
considerations and constantly reevaluate our conclusions. As Rawls put 
it, "the best account of a person's sense of justice is not the one which 
fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but 
rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium."153 
Under this approach, the role of law is to require the actors in the system 
to reflect-over and over again-on the decision they are charged with 
making. By encouraging this reflective process, the doctrine seeks to 
maximize the intuitive ability of all participants in the process to tap 
their individual innate moral sensibility. 
Alternatively, moral conclusions on capital sentences may be 
expressive rather than intuitive. That is, we may not figure them out 
through a process of considering alternatives. We just express what they 
are. To illustrate this approach, deciding whether a death penalty is 
appropriate in a particular case could be compared to deciding whether 
we are in love. The decision is not dictated by any calculus-internal or 
external-nor can it be corrected by any external source. Yet, it depends 
150. RAWLS, supra note 145, at 50 ("We may suppose that everyone has in himself 
the whole form of a moral conception."). 
151. /d.at47. 
152. The term intuitionist as used herein refers only to the belief that there is no 
single metastandard for moral decision-making and no method for assigning weights to 
the separate criteria relevant to moral decision-making. 
153. RAWLS, supra note 145, at 48; see GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY 
LIBERALISM: AN EsSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY 104 (1996). 
After a person has engaged in reflective equilibrium she is almost certain to 
possess a new set of moral beliefs, different from that with which she started. 
These differences will be of two types: Some beliefs previously held will be 
rejected, while some new moral beliefs will enter into her system. These will 
be inferred from the justified principles; once our beliefs are organized and 
explained, we can see implications ... of which we were not previously aware. 
GAUS, supra, at I 04. 
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on a social understanding of the word "love" in our language. Just as 
most of us have access to the resources we need to determine whether 
we are in love, we may have access to the resources we need to 
determine whether a death sentence is appropriate. Some of us may be 
absolutely certain, and some of us may never be sure. Here, the role of 
law may be an educative one: to ensure that the decisionmakers 
understand the expressive nature of the task they are performing so that 
they will access the right tools to express properly-given the rules of 
language-their moral conclusion. Just as we need to learn not to confuse 
love and lust, we need to learn not to confuse revulsion and desert. 
Whether intuitionist or expressive, one does need to recognize that 
something may go wrong. The ability of individuals to exercise moral 
judgment effectively does not guarantee that every judgment will 
properly tap the individual's moral sensibilities. On the contrary, 
judgments made when the individual is upset, angry, or overly self-
interested in the decision would be highly unlikely to exhibit the full 
capacity for moral judgment. 154 In addition, some individuals may not 
apply the moral tools accessible to them in good faith, or those tools 
might not be available to everyone who might come to play a role in 
capital sentencing. The role of law should be to foster an environment in 
which we can trust one's moral fiber to shine through.155 
This Article has shown that, to some extent, modern doctrine does just 
that by fostering responsibility at each stage so that an error at one stage 
may be corrected by responsible decision-makers at another.156 Most 
154. RAWLS, supra note 145, at 47. 
155. Id. at 47-48 (describing the concept of"consideredjudgments ... in which our 
moral capacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion," which Rawls 
considers those made "under conditions favorable for deliberation and judgment in 
general"). 
156. At least some empirical evidence suggests that juries are applying reasonably 
consistent criteria in determining what evidence suggests a death penalty is appropriate 
and what evidence is mitigating. 
[T]hey say that all victims are of equal worth, although they grant children 
special consideration. They shudder at sadistic violence, and they show little 
mercy to defendants who show no remorse. [And, they consider a defendant's 
potential to take additional lives.] ... 
. . . They attach significant mitigating potential to facts . . . that show 
diminished mental capacity ... , but they have little patience for defendants 
who attribute their wrongdoing to drugs or alcohol. 
Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors 
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1538-39, 1551-66 (1998). They also show some 
concern for defendants who grew up in poverty or were abused, particularly if they tried 
to get help. Id. at 1539. 
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obviously, appellate review may identify and remedy an irresponsible 
trial-level sentencing decision. A sentencer can also correct an 
overzealous prosecution decision, and a prosecutor can weigh the 
particular facts to refine the legislature's necessarily general decision on 
when to employ capital punishment. Part IV suggests two ways in 
which modem doctrine could be expanded to better foster an 
environment where trust would be possible. 
IV. REVISING MODERN DOCTRINE TO COMPORT WITH 
RESPONSIBILITY THEORY 
Although the structure of modem doctrine broadens responsibility in 
capital sentencing decisions compared to pre-Furman practice, a specific 
focus on that goal would lead to significant changes in modem doctrine 
that would further heighten individual responsibility. 157 First, the Court 
should put an end to the hodgepodge of approaches used to instruct 
sentencing juries. The Court has tended to bless any instructions that do 
not logically preclude the sentencer from considering and giving effect 
to mitigating evidence. 158 This deference has been supported by the 
notion that modem doctrine's consistency goal is advanced when states 
structure the sentencer' s role. 159 By focusing on individual 
responsibility, the pursuit of consistency for its own sake is eliminated, 
and with it, much of the justification for structuring the sentencer' s 
ultimate decision. 
Others have proposed telling sentencers flat out that they are 
ultimately responsible for the sentence. Implementing these suggestions 
would be a good start. But it would not be enough. Courts should go 
157. James Liebman recently set out an important reform proposal, in the spirit of 
those advanced here, that would heighten the prosecutor's individual responsibility by 
imposing a waiting period between indictment and the decision whether to seek a capital 
sentence, and would require prosecutors to present a detailed report justifying the 
decision to prosecute capitally. Liebman, supra note 4, at 2144-45. 
158. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 231-37 (2000) (upholding a death 
sentence despite potential jury confusion about its ability to impose a life sentence after 
finding an aggravating circumstance); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) 
(holding that an "absence of an instruction on the concept of mitigation" was not 
unconstitutional). 
159. See, e.g, Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 361 (1993). The individualization 
component of modem doctrine 
stand(s) only for the proposition that a State may not cut off in an absolute 
manner the presentation of mitigating evidence, either by statute or judicial 
instruction, or by limiting the inquiries to which it is relevant so severely that 
the evidence could never be part of the sentencing decision at all. 
Id. "[W]e have never concluded that States cannot channel jury discretion in capital 
sentencing in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the 
death penalty. Much in our cases suggests just the opposite." Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 
U.S. 164, 181 (1988). 
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further and replace neutrally worded, declaratory instructions with 
narratives that set out and legitimize both the government's argument for 
a death sentence, and the defense's argument against it, clearly and 
plainly stating that the sentencer has the responsibility to choose 
between them. 
Second, the vague requirement of meaningful appellate review should 
be fortified by requiring de novo review-the standard of review the 
Court has often required to safeguard other constitutional values-of 
every capital sentence. The state court should review the record to 
determine whether, in its own independent judgment, the judges 
believe-based on the same criteria applied by the original sentencer-
that a death sentence is a morally appropriate response to the defendant's 
crimes. This proposal is less radical than it might seem; it would merely 
bring capital punishment doctrine in line with the norm for reviewing 
mixed constitutional questions of law and fact that are similar in form to 
capital sentencing decisions. 
A. Strengthening Sentencer Responsibility 
Modem doctrine should prohibit instructions and argument that tend 
to shift responsibility from the sentencer to the legislator, reviewing 
court, or the community at large.160 Recognizing that individuals may 
160. Sherman, supra note 50, at 1244-45. 
Trial courts must. . . forbear making statements or g1vmg instructions 
suggesting that the jurors' verdict will or may be reviewed or reconsidered by 
anyone else or that any sentence they impose will or may be overturned or 
commuted. Prosecutors also, of course, must forbear making arguments that 
are inconsistent with any of these requirements. 
Liebman, supra note 4, at 2148; see Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from 
Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1003 n.56 (1996) 
("Capital sentencing juries are said to represent the 'conscience of the community.' 
However, they 'represent' the community only because they are members of the 
community, not because they discern and then apply community standards."). 
An example of the troubling sort of prosecutorial argument that should be prohibited 
was quoted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Myers: 
Your job is a fact-finding process. The law dictates what the penalty shall be 
depending upon what weight you give, what the total weight is to each 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance; and you are instructed ... that you are 
to weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors to determine 
which weighs the most and then the result is determined by that process. [<ll] It 
would not be appropriate for you to determine what result you want to obtain 
and then seek to shade the factors or the weight to give to the various factors. 
That would not be fulfilling your duties as a juror, and I am sure each of you 
will recognize the importance in the jury system of fulfilling your obligation as 
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seek ways to avoid responsibility for grave decisions, 161 capital 
sentencing doctrine should go beyond prohibiting responsibility-
lessening devices and employ techniques designed specifically to 
reinforce the sentencer's own sense of responsibility. These techniques 
may be as simple as emphasizing the names of jurors rather than 
referring to them by number, 162 or notifying jurors at the start of the 
sentencing proceeding that each juror must state in open court an 
individual view on whether this defendant deserves to die. 163 
In addition, courts should seriously consider prohibiting the jury from 
learning certain information, such as clemency eligibility or that the 
defendant had previously been sentenced to death. This type of 
information, even when it correctly reflects the law or historical fact, 
would tend to undermine the jurors' sense of responsibility without 
meaningfully contributing to the body of data necessary to a responsible 
capital sentencing decision. 164 To date, the Court has explicitly 
permitted instructions informing the jurors about these matters, as long 
as the information provided is accurate. 165 Those decisions should be 
a juror and doing that which the law instructs you to do. 
729 P.2d 698, 714 (1987). The prosecutor continued: 
[Defense counsel] is seeking to inject an element into this matter by saying, 
remarking that before you kill Mr. Myers, think of this, think of that. ['ll] 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the law has been written in a manner and you were voir 
dired very carefully about this. Your function is a fact-finding function solely, 
and that has been explained to you very carefully. ['ll] Once you determine, 
once you make a determination as to whether or not the aggravating 
circumstances or factors outweigh those in mitigation or the mitigating 
circumstances or factors outweigh those in aggravation, then the law says what 
verdict you shall return. ['ll] You don't make up your mind as to your 
preference for penalties. All you are doing is weighing, a weighing process; 
and the law is very explicit. ['ll] It is your duty as a juror, if you find that 
mitigating factors outweigh those in aggravation, it shall be your duty then to 
return a verdict of life without possibility of parole. ['ll] If you find that 
aggravating factors outweigh those in mitigation, it shall be your duty to affix 
the verdict of the death penalty. You don't determine that. The law has 
determined that for you. ['ll] And his statement, 'before you kill Mr. Myers,' is 
completely inappropriate. The law determines as to what the penalty is and it 
has always been that way. 
Id. at 714 n.14. 
161. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
162. Sherman, supra note 50, at 1246. 
163. Liebman, supra note 4, at 2148. 
164. Gillers, supra note 37, at 1107-10 (proposing that juries not be informed that 
their decision will be reviewed or that the alternative to a death sentence may be 
something less than life in prison); Blaine LeCesne, Tipping the Scales Toward Death: 
Instructing Capital Jurors on the Possibility of Executive Clemency, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1051, 1062-67 (1997). 
165. Romano v. California, 512 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1994) (allowing instructions 
informing jurors about a prior death sentence); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1004 
(1983) (allowing instruction pertaining to clemency). 
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rethought, at least at the state court level. 166 
In addition, trial courts should explicitly instruct jurors that they must 
take responsibility for their decision. For example, three commentators 
have suggested telling the jury "that the decision they are about to make 
is, despite its legal trappings, a moral one and that, in the absence of 
legal error, their judgment will be final."167 Another proposes 
specifically instructing jurors to look to their emotions in making the 
sentencing decision. 168 
Perhaps more important than the words of the instructions, however, is 
the voice used by the court in giving those instructions. Legal discourse 
is expressed in two very different voices that are sometimes called 
166. The idea of keeping accurate infonnation from the jury, while perhaps initially 
unsettling, has a long tradition in the jury system. For example, various rules prohibited 
juries from being told about the commutation power, the possibility of parole, or 
appellate review. See, e.g., Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1015 (Marshall, J., dissenting); People v. 
Morse, 388 P.2d 33, 43-47 (Cal. 1964); State v. Lindsey, 233 S.E.2d 734, 738 (W.Va. 
1977). Similarly, the Court refused to require an instruction under the federal death 
penalty informing the jury about the effect of a deadlock. Jones v. United States, 527 
U.S. 373, 383-84 (1999) (relying on reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court that 
"[w]hile this was a correct statement of law it ... was not one which should have been 
the subject of an instruction" and that "[i]t would have been an open invitation for the 
jury to avoid its responsibility and to disagree"); see also William J. Bowers & Benjamin 
D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices 
in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tux. L. REV. 605, 631-32 (1999); Le Cesne, supra note 164, 
at 1055-56. While the jury has the unreviewable power to acquit a defendant, neither 
the court nor the defense are permitted to tell the jury that this power exists. United 
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Weisberg, supra note 39, 
at 327 & n.89. Of course, rules developed in this context must be applied with caution. 
For example, while withholding infonnation about parole might be intended to bolster 
the jurors' sense of responsibility, it could have the opposite effect if jurors assume-as 
evidence suggests that they do-that defendants are parole-eligible sooner than they in 
fact are. Bowers & Steiner, supra, at 645-52, 656. "Jurors grossly underestimate how 
long capital murderers not sentenced to death usually stay in prison." Id. at 648. 
167. Eisenberg et al., supra note 51, at 379. The authors further propose that jurors 
should 
be expressly told that they are free to impose a life sentence even if they find 
the defendant's crime heinous, or the defendant himself to constitute a future 
danger, and that weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not 
meant to preempt, or provide a substitute for, the exercise of their own moral 
judgment in arriving at the defendant's sentence. Finally, jurors might also be 
instructed that, in the absence of legal error, their decision will not only be 
final, but also that, if they return a death sentence, their judgment will in the 
nonnal course of events ultimately lead to the defendant's execution. 
Id. at 379-80. 
168. Pillsbury, supra note 40, at 703-04 ("The courts have an obligation to 
minimize ... moral error by informing juries of their obligation to try to empathize with 
the offender as part of assessing deserved punishment."). 
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rights-talk, on the one hand, and storytelling or narration, on the other. 169 
When employing rights-talk, a lawyer defines the rights of the relevant 
parties and describes whether any of those rights have been breached. 
The decision-maker simply resolves the factual question and allocates 
the rights. 170 Any remedy flows directly from that conclusion. Was the 
contract breached? Was the Fourth Amendment violated? Rights-talk 
legal arguments often take these familiar forms. 
When employing narration, by contrast, the lawyer tells a story about 
a course of events in the world without the structure of formal rights as a 
mediating agent. The decision-maker then bears responsibility for 
supplying the moral criteria necessary to determine the result that should 
follow from the narrative. 171 Was the defendant the cause of plaintiffs 
injury? Would removing a child from the home be in the best interests 
of the child?172 While we do not tend to think of legal disputes as taking 
this form, these very common ones clearly do. 
Robin West has argued that the law calls for storytelling when it needs 
to "assign or deny responsibility" and with it, moral praise or 
condemnation.173 By contrast, the law calls for rights-talk to confirm 
"the irrelevance of responsibility."174 For example, a defendant whose 
privacy has been unlawfully invaded is denied a right-to be free from 
unreasonable searches-and is entitled to a remedy, regardless of 
whether the defendant was in any sense responsible for the conditions 
that led others to violate that right. This effect is not incidental, but 
rather, it is fundamental to the morality of a rights-based discourse. 175 
All individuals, regardless of apparent worth, are entitled to have their 
rights respected. 
Professor West speculates that a danger of relying too heavily on 
rights-talk "is that such a society may be dangerously inattentive to the 
very real need to assign and then acknowledge both individual and 
societal responsibility for the consequences of actions." 176 She focused 
her analysis on the use of different voices in appellate capital opinions to 
evaluate the defendant's responsibility for his predicament. 177 Her 
169. West, supra note 137, at 161-63. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. The competing views as to the morality of deciding legal questions through 
rights-talk or storytelling are concisely presented in West, supra note 137, at 163-66. 
173. Id. at 167; see id. at 175 ("[T]he narrative voice ... is the natural and perhaps 
inevitable means by which responsibility is ascribed.). 
174. /d.atl67. 
175. Id. at 173 & n.40. 
176. Id. at 167. 
177. By using the facts of the horrible crimes underlying the cases, West argued that 
opinions upholding death sentences brought out the defendant's responsibility for the 
crimes committed. Opinions employing rights-talk, by contrast, rendered the 
132 
[VOL. 39: 79, 2002] Responsibility in Capital Sentencing 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
insight into the relationship of responsibility and voice, however, could 
be productively employed during the jury instruction stage to help 
bolster the jury's sense of responsibility.178 
Typically, jury instructions are given in the voice of rights-talk.179 
The jury is told that the defendant has certain rights: the right to be 
presumed innocent unless the state proves each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the right to an acquittal if the defendant establishes 
certain affirmative defenses. Modem capital punishment doctrine has 
borrowed the rights-talk voice for capital sentencing instructions. This 
is particularly true where the jury is asked to answer a short list of 
specific questions and return a death verdict if the answer is yes. Here, 
the message is obvious: "The defendant has a right not to be executed 
unless the state has convinced you that the answer to the questions is 
yes." But even in states with more elaborate weighing statutes, the voice 
of the instructions is overwhelmingly rights-talk. The defendant has a 
right not to be executed unless the state proves that certain aggravating 
circumstances exist and outweigh any mitigating circumstances offered 
by the defendant. 
Delivering jury instructions in this voice tends to undermine the jury's 
sense of responsibility for its role, leading jurors to conclude that their 
job is to search for historical facts that mediate rights. Put another way, 
jurors see themselves as puzzle masters, piecing together a puzzle but 
bearing no real responsibility for deciding where the pieces should go. 
Courts could enhance jurors' sense of responsibility by augmenting 
the instructions defining the defendant's right not to be executed in 
certain circumstances with a narrative explanation of the jury's role. 
The judge would begin by explaining the law. The jury would be told 
that the legislature has decided that no one should be executed unless 
they fall into one of a set of identified categories. The jury's first job is 
to decide whether the defendant falls within one or more of those 
categories by evaluating the facts presented. If the jury believes that to 
defendant's responsibility irrelevant to the legitimacy of the death penalty in the cases 
before them. She faults both sets of opinions for failing to incorporate both voices, 
which would have enabled the Justices to provide a fuller moral account. Id. at 167-74. 
178. Using the narrative voice might also assist jurors in understanding the concepts 
of aggravating and mitigating evidence. See Tiersma, supra note 120, at 13-23 (citing 
evidence that jurors do not understand these terms as used in existing capital sentencing 
instructions). 
179. When a trial judge is the sentencer, no instructions are needed. But a judge's 
decision is informed by the same rights focus that is conveyed by the jury instructions. 
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be true, it must go on to its second job of deciding whether to execute 
this defendant. In contrast to the first inquiry, the judge would 
emphasize that the legislature has not decided when a particular 
defendant who has fallen within a category should actually be executed. 
This decision, the jurors would be told, requires them to do something 
much different than simply evaluating the facts presented, as they did in 
deciding if a defendant fits into the specified category. They must 
decide for themselves, based on the evidence and the narratives that the 
judge will proceed to read, whether the defendant deserves to die. 
After the necessary rights-based instructions, the judge would 
continue with a short story, provided by the prosecutor, illustrating why 
the state believes that the defendant should be executed. Next, the court 
would tell a story of similar length provided by the defense telling why 
the defendant should not be executed. These narratives would differ 
significantly from the attorneys' closing arguments because they would 
not refer to the required findings specified in the state's capital murder 
statute. Instead, the judge would describe the defendant and the crime 
using the ordinary language of responsibility, unmediated by legal 
formalism. The jurors would thus be provided with the stuff of human 
decision-making that they need to decide, responsibly, whether the 
defendant should be executed. 180 
180. Professor West has argued that the narrative voice fulfills a need 
to understand what happened and why. We need to hear about the event that 
caused the arrest, about the life circumstances that caused and arguably 
mitigates the criminality of the event, and the social realities that engendered, 
facilitated, or permitted the life circumstances. We need to learn once again to 
recognize these people as human, as "like us." We need that gap of emphatic 
understanding closed. We need to be given a stake in their lives, and in the 
communities from which they come. We need to be made responsible. 
West, supra note 137, at 176. 
Appropriate narratives would be case- and community-specific. The following 
truncated examples, in a hypothetical felony-murder case in which the defendant is 
convicted of murdering a shop owner and injuring his daughter in the course of a 
robbery, convey the basic idea: 
Prosecution: "The defendant went from work to the street that payday, buying alcohol 
and shooting dice. After a few hours, his week's pay was gone. He lost it to gambling 
and the bottle, and he was upset about that. So he picked up a shot gun and went to a 
local convenience store. Then he waited, lying on the ground out of sight. When the 
owner and his daughter finally emerged from the store, he fired without warning. As the 
owner was bleeding to death, and his daughter lay on the ground terrified with shot gun 
pellets in her eyes, the defendant grabbed the money box and ran. And he'd still be 
running today had we not found his cap near the empty box in the swamp." 
Defense: "Before that day, William had no criminal record and a good reputation in the 
community. People know him as Poochy, and they knew that he was borderline 
mentally retarded. Yet, he held a job at the gas station, and helped his former wife with 
the kids. Indeed, if William hadn't confessed to shooting the store owner and his 
daughter, it would be hard to believe that he did it. But he did confess, because he 
understood it was wrong to even consider stealing that money. And even more so, he 
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The court would follow the narratives by reiterating that the law 
guides the jury only by focusing its attention on certain factors and 
enabling it to put aside preconceptions and prejudices that might, 
perhaps subconsciously, impact an unguided decision. The law does 
not, by contrast, dictate a result; it cannot tell any individual juror 
whether a death sentence is appropriate. 
B. Strengthening the Meaningful Appellate Review Requirement 
Modern doctrine fails to fulfill the ambitions of the responsibility 
theory most severely in the way it treats appellate courts. Given our 
predilection to transfer responsibility for grave decisions, appellate 
judges are the most vulnerable in the entire capital punishment system. 
They regularly and systematically defer to trial court and jury decisions 
in a broad array of contexts, 181 and they are thus especially likely to side 
step responsibility for capital sentences by deferring to the trial-level 
sentencer's decision. In order to maximize appellate judges' sense of 
responsibility, they should satisfy themselves that the substantive Eighth 
Amendment standard has been met by reviewing the ultimate sentencing 
decision de novo, just as appellate courts conduct searching and 
independent review of similar mixed questions of fact and law in other 
constitutional contexts.182 
knows it was wrong to lose control as he did when he started firing that shot gun. The 
point, though, is that he was not in control. He was under emotional strain, and alcohol 
surely contributed. And once the shots were fired, he just panicked." 
181. Historically, appellate courts have adopted a very deferential stance in 
reviewing guilty verdicts and, to an even greater extent, sentencing decisions. See 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (deferential stance in reviewing guilty 
verdicts); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424,443 (1974) (explaining that once it 
is determined that a sentence is within the limits set forth in the statute under which it is 
imposed, appellate review is at an end). 
182. Others have proposed proportionality review-comparisons of cases by an 
appellate court to minimize aberrational sentences-a suggestion that flows naturally 
from the consistency goal. See Liebman, supra note 4, at 2148-49; Steiker & Steiker, 
supra note 2, at 414-21. The substantive review proposed here flows instead from the 
individual responsibility goal. State appellate courts would not simply compare death 
sentences in order to identify those that differ in some objective sense from the norm. 
That requirement would still permit judges to avoid responsibility by relying on trial 
level conclusions in other cases. Substantive review would require appellate judges to 
satisfy themselves-by the same means that we ask of jurors and sentencing judges at 
the trial level-that each defendant is sufficiently more culpable than other first-degree 
murderers to justify a sentence of death. Cf. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Substance and 
Procedure in Capital Cases: Why Federal Habeas Courts Should Review the Merits of 
Every Death Sentence, 78 Tux. L. REV. 1771, 1797 (2000) (contrasting proportionality 
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The following subsections first set out the uncertain place that 
appellate review currently has in modem capital punishment doctrine. 
They then demonstrate that the Court has routinely encouraged 
individual responsibility among appellate judges reviewing a wide 
variety of constitutional questions by demanding that they conduct de 
novo review to protect constitutional values. The same considerations 
that motivated the Court in those cases apply to capital punishment, and 
a similarly rigorous review requirement is thus appropriate. The final 
subsections describe the dimensions of the review that would be 
required, in particular, the wisdom of limiting that review to a single 
state appellate court. 
1. The Role of Appellate Review in Capital Punishment Doctrine 
The initial capital punishment cases emphasized the opportunity for 
meaningful appellate review as an important factor in upholding the 
post-Furman statutes. 183 But the Court later held that proportionality 
review-the practice of comparing capital cases to guard against 
aberrational death sentences-is not constitutionally required. 184 The 
Court has had very little to say since about the general role of appellate 
courts in the capital sentencing process. While one could point to 
passages in certain cases suggesting that some form of meaningful 
appellate review is required to satisfy the Eighth Amendment, 185 there 
review with de novo substantive review of a type that may differ in some regards from 
that proposed here). 
183. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) ("By providing prompt judicial 
review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a 
means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences 
under law."); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (noting that "meaningful 
appellate review" is made possible by the requirement that the trial judge justify the 
imposition of a death sentence with written findings and observing that the Florida 
Supreme Court indicated that it conducted an independent analysis of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in the particular case); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
195 (197 6) ("Where the sentencing authority is required to specify the factors it relied 
upon in reaching its decision, the further safeguard of meaningful appellate review is 
available to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish 
manner."). The effectiveness of appellate review during that period may be questioned. 
See generally George E. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 
GEO. L.J. 97 (1979); Ellen Liebman, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: A Critique of 
Proportionality Review, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1433 (1985). 
Even pre-Funnan, the Court suggested that there is a heightened need for review in 
capital cases. See Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 708 (1949) (applying an added 
requirement in a capital case that the lower court explain the basis for denying a motion 
to reopen a judgment of conviction based on newly discovered evidence). 
184. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 46 (1984). 
185. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990) (commenting that 
"this Court has repeatedly emphasized that meaningful appellate review of death 
sentences promotes reliability and consistency"). Zant v. Stephens upheld a death 
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are also passages suggesting that appellate review is not constitutionally 
required. 186 
In a line of cases dealing with whether appellate courts may uphold 
death sentences even though the sentencer considered an 
unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance, the Court has 
expressed concern about overly deferential appellate review.187 For 
example, it has prohibited the automatic affirmance of a death sentence 
whenever at least one valid aggravating circumstance is found by the 
sentencer. 188 Instead, an appellate court must independently review the 
sentence where one of three aggravating circumstances was unconstitutionally vague and 
explained: 
Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of an important 
procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death sentence 
by the Georgia Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure 
proportionality. We accept that court's view that the subsequent invalidation 
of one of several statutory aggravating circumstances does not automatically 
require reversal of the death penalty, having been assured that a death sentence 
will be set aside if the invalidation of an aggravating circumstance makes the 
penalty arbitrary or capricious. 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983); see California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543 
(1987); Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45 (stating that "the opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens [in Gregg] suggested that some form of meaningful appellate review is 
required"); id. at 54 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I believe the case law does establish that 
appellate review plays an essential role in eliminating the systemic arbitrariness and 
capriciousness which infected death penalty schemes invalidated by Furman . . . , and 
hence that some form of meaningful appellate review is constitutionally required."); id. 
at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n each of the statutory schemes approved in our prior 
cases ... meaningful appellate review is an indispensable component of the Court's 
determination that the State's capital sentencing procedure is valid."). 
186. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (''There is no 
question but that the Louisiana scheme narrows the class of death-eligible murderers and 
then at the sentencing phase allows for the consideration of mitigating circumstances and 
the exercise of discretion. The Constitution requires no more."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987) (summarizing modern doctrine without reference to any 
appellate review requirement). 
187. Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 52 (1992); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 
540 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 230 (1992) (''We require close appellate 
scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating factors to implement the well-
established Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing determinations 
in death penalty cases."); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 322 (1991); Clemons, 494 
U.S. at 738. 
188. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 752 ("An automatic rule of affirmance in a weighing 
State [when at least one valid aggravating circumstance is found by the sentencer] would 
be invalid under Lockett . . . [and] Eddings ... , for it would not give defendants the 
individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of 
mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances."). 
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evidence. 189 Absent constitutional error, however, the Court has 
suggested that an appellate court may satisfy any meaningful appellate 
review requirement by merely determining "that the sentencer could 
have arrived at the death sentence that was imposed."190 That standard is 
akin to the sufficiency of the evidence standard and differs markedly 
from the de novo review applied to the constitutional questions discussed 
below. 
2. Considering Appellate Review of Capital Cases in Light of the 
Review Required in Other Constitutional Cases 
The doctrine designed to safeguard the values underlying many 
constitutional clauses - including key clauses in the First, 191 Fourth, 192 
Fifth, 193 Sixth, 194 Eighth, 195 and Fourteenth Amendments196-requires de 
novo review of substantive constitutional issues. The Court's failure to 
impose a similar requirement in capital cases has never been fully 
explained. This subsection describes the constitutional issues in capital 
cases and compares them to other cases in which de novo review is 
required. It concludes that there is no structural difference compelling 
more deferential review in capital cases. On the contrary, the need for 
encouraging individual responsibility among appellate judges is, if 
anything, stronger. 
a. The Substantive Constitutional Question in Capital Cases 
Much of modem capital punishment doctrine is procedural. But 
underlying that procedure is an important substantive core. To satisfy 
189. In Clemons, the Court held that an appellate court could satisfy this 
requirement either by (1) determining beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentencer 
would have imposed a death sentence (without considering the invalid factors or with 
properly defined factors) or (2) reweighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
and making an independent determination that a death sentence is appropriate (again, 
either ignoring the improper factor or after properly defining it). Id. at 752-53. 
190. Id. at 749. 
191. See infra Part IV.B.2.i-ii. 
192. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.iii. 
193. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 (1995) (holding that the in custody 
requirement of the Miranda rule is subject to de novo review). 
194. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) (holding reasonableness 
of counsel subject to de novo review); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341 (1980) 
(holding potential conflict of interest from multiple representation subject to de novo 
review); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397 & n.4, 403-04 (1977) (holding waiver 
of Sixth Amendment right to counsel subject to de novo review). 
195. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.iv. 
196. See Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591,597 (1982) (holding sufficiency of pretrial 
identification procedures subject to de novo review); infra Part IV.B.2.b.v (discussing 
the due process implications of punitive damages). 
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constitutional muster, the Court has held, all sentencing schemes must 
select a subset of all first-degree murderers who are more deserving of 
death than others. Merely establishing a procedure that requires the 
sentencer to find an aggravating circumstance is not enough. "If the 
sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies 
to every defendant eligible for the death penalty," the Court has 
explained, "the circumstance is constitutionally infirm."197 The Court 
thus struck down a death sentence where it concluded that "[t]he 
petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness 
materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder .... 
[As a result t]here is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which 
the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was 
not."19s 
Similarly, procedures that merely require the sentencer to consider 
mitigating evidence are not sufficient. The sentencer must have a means 
to give effect to that evidence, by imposing a life sentence, to ensure that 
the substantive requirement-that each death sentence will constitute a 
reasoned moral conclusion that the defendant is more deserving than 
197. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463,474 (1993). 
Our precedents make clear that a State's capital sentencing scheme also must 
"genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." ... 
When the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the 
sentencer to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who 
do not, the circumstance must provide a principled basis for doing so. 
Id. (citations omitted); see Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) ("[T]he 
aggravating circumstance ... may not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; it 
must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder."); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 
U.S. 764, 776 (1990) ('We have reiterated the general principle that aggravating 
circumstances must be construed to permit the sentencer to make a principled distinction 
between those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not."); see also Scott W. 
Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented 
Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 323, 418 (1992) ("Regulating capital sentencing 
under the Eighth Amendment requires a standard to determine when a death sentence in 
an individual case is just."). 
198. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980). In McClesky, the Court 
explained that "there is a required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be 
imposed. In this context, the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the 
decisionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's 
case meet the threshold." 481 U.S. at 305. As Professor Schopp has explained: 
Statutes that narrow the set of death-eligible offenders by selecting only those 
who qualify as more culpable, more likely to recidivate, or more appropriate 
for capital punishment according to some other legitimate systemic criterion 
serve to reduce the number of death-eligible offenders in a manner that 
justifies the more severe punishment of those selected. 
Schopp, supra note 40, at 482. 
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others-is met. 199 As the Court recently explained, 
the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a capital sentencing jury 
[does not satisfy] the Eighth Amendment. Nor ... is [it] constitutionally 
sufficient to inform the jury that it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in 
deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key ... is that the jury be able to 
"consider and give effect to [a defendant's mitigating] evidence in imposing 
sentence."200 
The role of the sentencer in a capital case is thus to determine whether 
the facts presented at the sentencing trial demonstrate that the defendant 
is sufficiently more culpable than any other first-degree murderer to 
justify a death sentence. Even if the proper procedures were in place, a 
death sentence could nonetheless fail to satisfy the substantive standard 
if the defendant is not sufficiently culpable to justify death. 
b. Other Substantive Constitutional Questions 
Constitutional questions under the Free Speech, Excessive Fines, 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and Due Process Clauses bear almost 
precisely the same structure as the constitutional issue faced in capital 
cases. In each case, the Court has established a procedural framework 
designed to implement a vaguely worded, essentially judge-made 
substantive constitutional standard that is designed to safeguard the 
values underlying the particular clause of the Constitution. Each time, 
the Court has demanded that lower courts engage in de novo review of 
the substantive question, even though the required procedures were 
employed. 
i. Obscenity 
In the late 1950s, the Court held that obscene speech may be 
suppressed when it (1) appeals to a prurient interest, (2) is patently 
offensive, and (3) lacks social value.201 The Court initially suggested 
that there would be little role for appellate courts. If the trial court 
199. Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1920-24 (2001); McKoy v. North Carolina, 
494 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988). 
200. Penry, 121 S. Ct. at 1920. 
201. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 487, 492 (1957). The Court later 
refined the test in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court declared that: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; . . . (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
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followed the correct procedure, the finder of fact would have the last 
word-subject to deferential sufficiency of the evidence review. 202 
Justice Harlan wrote a separate opinion cautioning against that 
approach. The constitutional issue, he wrote, was "not really an issue of 
fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and 
delicate kind."203 Every case involving the suppression of speech "has 
an individuality and 'value' of its own."204 But that uniqueness, Harlan 
reasoned, weighed in favor of heightened review, not deference: "[A] 
reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked 
expression is suppressible within constitutional standards. Since the 
standards do not readily lend themselves to generalized definitions, the 
constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of particularized 
judgments which appellate courts must make for themselves."205 Harlan 
concluded with a concern that the majority's approach would "tend to 
obscure the peculiar responsibilities resting on state and federal courts in 
this field and encourage them to rely on easy labeling and jury verdicts 
as a substitute for facing up to the tough individual problems of 
constitutional judgment involved in every obscenity case."206 
Within a few years, the Court came to agree with Justice Harlan that 
appellate courts could not rely "on a 'sufficient evidence' standard of 
review," but must instead review the decision de novo.207 In the early 
1970s, however, the Court reformulated the obscenity test in a way that 
emphasized an appeal to local community standards that could not be 
dictated by the state legislature.208 Again, doubt was cast on the role of 
appellate review, but the Court stood firm. Obscenity doctrine, it 
reiterated, contained a substantive component that appellate courts were 
required to police.209 Requiring juries to decide obscenity cases "in 
accordance with their own understanding of the tolerance of the average 
person in their community," the Court explained, "does not mean ... 
that obscenity convictions will be virtually unreviewable."210 On the 
202. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489-92. 
203. Id. at 498 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
204. Id. at 497. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 498 (emphasis added). 
207. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 & n.6 (1964) ("[T]his Court cannot 
avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to 
whether the material involved is constitutionally protected."). 
208. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1977). 
209. Id. at 301, 305. 
210. Id. at 305; id. at 301 (applying "community standards does not mean, however, 
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contrary, the Court held that "[t]he type of conduct depicted must fall 
within the substantive limitations suggested" by the Court, and appellate 
courts had a responsibility to ensure the preservation of constitutional 
values.211 
ii. Libel 
In New York Times v. Sullivan,212 the Court again adopted an 
imprecise constitutional standard that asked the trier of fact to make 
findings based on its understanding of human nature. The Free Speech 
clause was said to require that, in a libel case, a public figure must prove 
that the defendant acted with actual malice, that is, purposely 2ublished 
a false statement or exhibited a reckless disregard for the truth.213 As in 
the obscenity cases, the Court imposed a duty on appellate courts to 
completely and independently examine the record to protect First 
Amendment values. 
The Court's reasoning mirrored that in the obscenity cases. It held 
that this "rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitutional 
responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact."214 This rule, 
the Court explained, "reflects a deeply held conviction that judges ... 
must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties 
established and ordained by the Constitution."215 This is true even 
where, if not especially where, the substantive standard is "not readily 
captured in 'one infallible definition."'216 
iii. Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion 
Before police officers may stop and frisk an individual, the Fourth 
that juror discretion in this area is to go unchecked"). 
211. Id. at 305. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159-60 (1974), 
the Court unanimously rejected the argument that, under Miller, once the jury resolved 
the obscenity question, the job of the appellate court was merely to determine whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support it. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, 
explained that appellate courts retained "the ultimate power . . . to conduct an 
independent review of constitutional claims" and "when necessary" they were obligated 
to exercise that power to preserve First Amendment values. Id. at 160; see also Pope v. 
Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,503 (1987); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 160 (1974). 
212. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
213. Id. at 279-80. 
214. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984); see 
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) 
("'[J]udges, as expositors of the Constitution,' have a duty to 'independently decide 
whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional 
threshold .... "' (quoting Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511)). 
215. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510-11. 
216. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 491 U.S. at 686. 
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Amendment requires that they must have a reasonable, articuable 
suspicion that the individual is "armed and dangerous."217 fu order to 
conduct a full-scale search, the officer must have probable cause to 
believe that evidence of criminal activity will be found in the place to be 
searched.218 fu considering the appropriate standard of review for these 
constitutional standards, the Court explained that "[a]rticulating 
precisely what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is not 
possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal 
with 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. "'219 The Court 
distinguished these sorts of legal standards from more precise concepts 
such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt where greater deference is 
appropriate.220 "[F]luid concepts" like probable cause, the Court 
explained, "talce their substantive content from the particular contexts in 
which the standards are being assessed,"221 and as a result, one case will 
seldom serve as precedent for another.222 Nevertheless, an appellate 
court must review the trial decision de novo in order to protect Fourth 
Amendment values.223 
iv. Excessive Fines 
The Constitution prohibits a government imposed fine that is "grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense."224 That standard 
is similar, in its lack of precision and its reference to communal values, 
to the standards applied in other constitutional cases.225 Not 
surprisingly, when the Court recently faced the issue for the first time, it 
required de novo appellate review despite the case-by-case nature of the 
inquiry.226 
217. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
218. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). 
219. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,695 (1996) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 
231). 
220. Id. at 696. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 698. 
223. Id. at 691. 
224. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). 
225. Id. at 336 (describing the standard as "inherently imprecise"). 
226. Id. at 336 & n.10. Perhaps more surprising, however, was the Court's reliance on 
cases decided under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to support its decision to 
require de novo review. Id. at 336 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)) (holding 
that a term of life in prison for a minor felony constituted cruel and unusual punishment). 
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v. Punitive Damages 
The Court's treatment of punitive damages perhaps most closely 
mirrors the development of modern capital punishment doctrine. 
Historically, civil juries had broad discretion to impose punitive 
damages just as capital juries had complete discretion to impose death 
sentences.227 In the early 1990s, however, the Court began to build 
doctrine to govern punitive damages cases just as it had done in the 
1970s with respect to capital cases, this time relying on the Due Process 
Clause.228 
As a matter of procedure, the Court held, states had to instruct the jury 
that it must distinguish between compensatory damages, which redress a 
loss, and punitive damages, which punish the defendant and deter future 
wrongful conduct.229 As a matter of substance, the Court held that 
punitive damages could not be grossly excessive with respect to the 
defendant's conduct-the very same substantive standard that it applies 
under both the Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clauses.230 During the 2001 term, the Court explicitly required de novo 
review of the substantive constitutional question.231 
c. No Meaningful Distinctions Justify More Deferential Review in 
Capital Cases 
While the Court has never directly distinguished capital cases from 
other types of constitutional cases with respect to appellate review 
requirements, potential distinctions suggest themselves: the vagueness of 
the inquiry, the historical pedigree of the constitutional standard, and the 
traditional deference accorded to guilt and sentencing determinations. 
With respect to vagueness, the imprecise nature of the standard might 
counsel in favor of deference to the finder-of-fact. Appellate review of a 
substantive standard that draws on communal values is arguably mere 
second-guessing by judges more distant from both the presentation of 
evidence and, probably, the communal values that inform the 
constitutional decision.232 Rigorous review of the procedural regularity 
227. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 15-17 (1991). 
228. See id. at 18-24. 
229. Id. at 19. 
230. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod. 
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-55 (1993) (plurality). 
231. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 
(2001); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) (holding appellate review 
constitutionally required without reaching the question of the standard of review). 
232. Although the Court has been less open about the role of communal values in 
capital sentencing than it has been, for example, in the obscenity area, the case law as a 
whole indicates that communal values must play a role in capital sentencing. Stanford v. 
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of the proceeding, one might think, would be the only appropriate role 
for an appellate court. 
As the above survey indicates, however, in dealing with virtually 
every other serious constitutional question, the Court has not followed 
that reasoning.233 Instead, it has required de novo review of the 
substantive standard. Vague rules take their meaning from their 
application rather than their terms. "[T]he content of the rule," the Court 
explained, "is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given 
meaning through the evolutionary process of common-law 
adjudication."234 Where constitutional concepts are "fluid" and "cannot 
be articulated with precision,"235 independent appellate review is 
"necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, 
the legal principles"236 and "assure the uniform treatment of similarly 
situated persons that is the essence oflaw itself."237 
This rationale for heightened review is consistent with the view that 
appellate judges must take responsibility for safeguarding constitutional 
values by controlling the development of substantive constitutional 
norms. Trial-level discretion is critical, but not infallible. Substantive 
de novo review is thus required. Since capital cases are not structurally 
different from the aforementioned constitutional cases-in each a trier-
of-fact must determine whether relevant facts fit within the scope of an 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (plurality); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 
(1987); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 173, 190 (1976). 
233. Constitutional issues on which appellate courts are not required to conduct an 
independent review are those in which the trial judge has unique access to evidence 
necessary to make critical credibility determinations. See, e.g., Maggio v. Fulford, 462 
U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (discussing competency to stand trial); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 
1025, 1036 (1984) (discussing juror impartiality). 
234. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984); 
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,686 (1989) ("[O]nly 
through the course of case-by-case adjudication can we give content to these otherwise 
elusive constitutional standards."). 
235. Cooper Industries, 121 S. Ct. at 1685. 
236. Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,697 (1996)); Thompson v. 
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 115 (1995) ("[T]he law declaration aspect of independent review 
potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law."). 
237. Cooper Industries, 121 S. Ct. at 1685 (quoting BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559,587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)). The Court has echoed Justice 
Stevens' more general concern expressed in an early obscenity case that "the 
constitutional values protected ... make it imperative that judges ... make sure that it is 
correctly applied." Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 502; Harte-Hanks Communications, 491 
U.S. at 686 ("[O]nly through the course of case-by-case adjudication can we give content 
to these otherwise elusive constitutional standards."). 
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imprecise judge-made substantive rule that draws on communal 
values-appellate judge responsibility should be no less important when 
the defendant's life is at issue than where his privacy or freedom of 
speech rights are threatened. 
As a matter of history, the constitutional standard in capital cases is 
relatively new and does not emerge readily from the text of the 
Constitution. But the same could be said of most of these other 
constitutional standards. The obscenity, libel, and reasonable suspicion 
standards were developed in the 1950s and 1960s. The grossly 
excessive standard was not applied to punitive damages and excessive 
fines until the 1990s. And aside from the Fourth Amendment standards, 
these other constitutional rules have as little relation to the constitutional 
text as the capital punishment standard. 
A more plausible basis to distinguish capital sentencing would look to 
the deference extended to a jury that determines a defendant's guilt and a 
trial judge's sentencing decision in noncapital cases. Neither has been 
held constitutionally entitled to any appellate review at all.238 And while 
review is universal, it is quite deferential.239 However, a capital 
sentencing decision differs from a guilt determination because it is not 
constitutionally committed to a jury, and because it is fluid and 
dependent on communal values to a much greater extent. The Court has 
recognized this distinction in cases holding that appellate courts may 
impose a capital sentence when a trial-level error undermines the 
238. In an 1894 case, the Court held that the appeal of a criminal conviction "is not 
now a necessary element of due process of law" and therefore "the right of appeal may 
be accorded by the State to the accused upon such terms as in its wisdom may be deemed 
proper." McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894). Today, however, "every 
state and the federal government provides some means of appellate review for 
defendants in criminal cases." WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 863 (2d ed. 1992). As a result, the Court has not been squarely presented 
with the issue whether a defendant does have a constitutional right to appeal. The Court 
has, however, continued to cite with approval McKane's decision that such a right does 
not exist. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("There is, of course, no 
constitutional right to an appeal .... "); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). 
239. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 & n.13 (1979) (holding that the 
standard of review, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, 
is whether a rational jury could have found each fact necessary to the conviction beyond 
a reasonable doubt; "this inquiry does not require a court to 'ask itself whether it believes 
that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"' and "it does 
not require scrutiny of the reasoning process actually used by the factfinder"). The 
limited scope of review may be due to a concern that appellate courts should "impinge[] 
upon 'jury' discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental 
protection of due process of law." Id. at 319. Three justices in Jackson argued that 
courts should presume "that trial judges and juries will act rationally and honestly in 
applying the reasonable-doubt standard, at least so long as the trial is free of procedural 
error and the record contains evidence tending to prove each of the elements of the 
offense." Id. at 335 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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original sentence.240 
To be sure, the Court could logically rely on the tradition of 
deferential review of judicial sentencing to justify limited review of the 
substance of a death sentence. The most persuasive counterargument 
may be that, if the Constitution requires de nova appellate review as a 
safeguard against excessive fines and unjustifiably high punitive damage 
awards judged under a case-by-case substantive standard that asks 
whether they are grossly excessive, then surely a death sentence should 
be subject to searching appellate review as well. 
3. Defining the Scope of De Novo Review of Capital Cases 
Appellate judges reviewing a capital sentence de nova would make an 
independent judgment as to whether certain constitutional facts have 
been established, in the same way that appellate courts reach 
independent conclusions about whether a libel defendant acted with 
actual malice or whether a particular fine or punitive damage award is 
grossly excessive. As in other cases, historical facts found by the trial 
court or jury would be accepted by the appellate court, particularly 
where they turned on credibility determinations. But the essential 
constitutional question-whether this particular defendant is sufficiently 
more deserving of death than other first-degree murderers-would be 
reviewed de nova. As a practical matter, appellate courts in capital cases 
would not ignore a trial-level sentencer's decision, just as an appellate 
court does not ignore a jury decision that a particular form of speech is 
obscene. The appellate court should, however, incorporate the prior 
decision into its own independent calculus rather than defer to that 
decision. 
4. Limiting the De Novo Review Requirement to State Court 
In contrast to the state appellate de nova review standard proposed 
here, Professor Hoffman recently argued that federal habeas courts 
should engage in de nova substantive review of death sentences so that 
"the imposition of the death penalty is based ... on the continuing moral 
certainty-at every stage of the post-trial proceedings-that the 
defendant" deserves to die.241 His article was written for a symposium 
240. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384-88 (1986). 
241. Hoffmann, supra note 182, at 1796. "It is intolerable," he concludes, "for a 
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on habeas corpus, but he suggested that substantive review might be 
required in state direct appeal and postconviction proceedings as well.242 
While Professor Hoffman's proposal and the one offered here likely 
arise from the same important concern, his proposal fails to 
meaningfully explain what he would have habeas courts do, and perhaps 
for that reason, he fails to take account of considerations that favor 
placing the only de nova substantive review requirement on a state 
appellate court. First, his description of what federal habeas courts 
would actually do is confusing. He suggests both that these judges must 
tap their own "intuitive moral rationality" but also make an "objective 
judgment based on an interpretation of the community's moral 
standards"; "setting aside personal idiosyncrasies"; and "striv[ing] to 
stand in the shoes of society at large."243 An appeal to moral intuition is 
far different from an objective assessment of community standards. In 
any event, both are problematic. 
There is little reason to have confidence in either a federal habeas 
court's moral intuition or its ability to apply community values. The 
sentencing trial should be shaped to maximize the responsibility of the 
sentencer-to create an environment where we can trust the judge or 
jury's reflective moral intuition-in part because the sentencer is the 
community and not a visionary objective assessor of the community's 
moral fiber.244 It may be possible to create a similar environment of 
trust in a state appellate court that regularly applies the same capital 
sentencing scheme and has insight into the moral structure of the society 
through the range of state law issues that come before it. That level of 
trust probably could not be created in federal habeas courts. 
Second, Professor Hoffman appreciates the argument that the 
substantive review he proposes might lessen the original sentencer's 
sense of responsibility, but he correctly concludes that that risk is 
minimal and worth taking.245 He is right about that, in part, because 
when sentencing juries think about appellate review, they probably 
assume that someone will review their decision de nova. They are likely 
habeas court reviewing a state death penalty case to be unable to consider directly ... the 
sense that the defendant, even though guilty, does not deserve to die for his crime .... " 
Id. at 1793. "The habeas court should be morally responsible for ensuring that each 
individual death sentence is imposed upon a defendant who is actually guilty and 
deserves to die." Id. at 1801. 
242. Id. at 1797 n.149. 
243. Id. at 1798. 
244. Garvey, supra note 156, at 1003 n.56 ("Capital sentencing juries are said to 
represent the 'conscience of the community.' However, they 'represent' the community 
only because they are members of the community, not because they discern and then 
apply community standards."). 
245. Hoffman, supra note 182, at 1799 n.156. 
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to continue to believe that no matter what trial judges tell them. 
Professor Hoffman fails to appreciate, however, the effect of de novo 
habeas review on the sense of responsibility of the state appellate courts. 
If those judges lrnow that there is a federal back-up system, particularly 
given the political pressures on some state supreme courts, they may 
leave the dirty work to federal courts.246 Additionally, there are reasons 
to believe that the federal courts will not do that dirty work particularly 
well. First, federal habeas courts may be too far from the sentence to be 
capable of conducting the appropriate moral inquiry. To be sure, they 
may be geographically closer to the local courthouse than the state 
supreme court. But they do not deal with the range of state law issues 
that arguably makes the state court more connected with the community 
imposing the sentence. And, in any event, at least some federal judges 
will always tend to defer to state court decisions, particularly one as 
subjective as a capital sentencing decision, because of deep-seated 
beliefs in federalism and cornity.247 
Professor Hoffman suggests that federal courts may take their 
responsibility seriously because they will lrnow that the case is almost 
over.248 That is a fair point, but the same could be said of the state 
appellate court if its decision were the last meaningful line of defense. 
Changes to the habeas statute should have already alerted state a,gpellate 
courts that they are much closer to the end than they once were.2 
A third problem with Professor Hoffman's proposal is that it has no 
246. Paul M. Bator posed the concern in the context of federal habeas generally, 
stating: 
I could imagine nothing more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility, 
of the inner subjective conscientiousness, which is so essential a part of the 
difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of 
the notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else. 
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441,451 (1963). 
247. To be sure, there are reasons to believe that, as a practical matter, elected state 
court judges will also fail to take sufficient responsibility for reviewing capital sentences. 
Federal review to ensure that state appellate courts are taking their responsibility 
seriously, however, is a better approach then extending substantive review into the 
federal system. 
248. Hoffman, supra note 182, at 1799. 
249. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, amended the federal habeas corpus statute to make it harder to 
obtain federal relief for constitutional violations occurring in state criminal proceedings. 
Most importantly, the amendment required federal courts to uphold a reasonable state 
court interpretation of federal law even if that interpretation was erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(l)-(2) (Supp. IV 1999). 
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logical ending place. If a federal habeas court lets the death sentence 
stand, then presumably the federal court of appeals and the U.S. 
Supreme Court must apply the same substantive analysis. But why stop 
there? Those judges have no monopoly on moral wisdom. Why not ask 
a passerby on the street in front of the Supreme Court and let that person 
have the last word? The reason, obviously, is that we would have no 
reason to trust the moral judgment of a passerby, who is too distant from 
the community imposing the death sentence. The real issue should be 
who is best placed so that society can trust their moral judgment-
arguably, the original sentencer and possibly a state appellate court. 
Pushing beyond that simply weakens the system by undermining the 
sense of responsibility of earlier participants in the process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps inevitably, an article that sets out to defend existing doctrine 
will be read as an apology: a call to accept what we have because the 
alternative is so much worse. While all that may be true, this Article 
aspires to a broader purpose: to show that the answer to the death 
penalty question does not lie in some secret formula that remains to be 
discovered. Rather, the answer-if there is one-"has been here for a 
long time already, and only our own blindness and weakness has 
prevented us from seeing it around us and within us, and kept us from 
developing it. "250 When it comes to doctrinal regulation of the death 
penalty, we are much closer to as good as it gets than we have realized. 
Future political choices about capital punishment should be made with 
that in mind. 
250. HAVEL, The Power, supra note 74, at 214. 
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